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ABSTRACT
Burma is predominantly an agricultural country. A large 
proportion of the population relies on agriculture for its livelihood, 
and most of the foreign exchange earnings are provided by agriculture. 
Rice traditionally has dominated the agricultural and export sectors.
The three Burmese governments since independence have aimed to 
diversify agriculture away from the dependence on rice. The most 
recent government has sought to diversify exports. The major aim of 
this study is to examine patterns of both agricultural production and 
exports, to see if they have diversified. Reasons for any 
diversification are also explored, with most emphasis placed on price 
policy.
The major conclusion is that there has been some diversification 
in both production and exports since independence. However, it is 
difficult to link these changes to price policy. At times it seems 
that this diversification may have occurred despite government policy
rather than because of it.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Burma
The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma lies in South-east 
Asia between latitudes 10 N and 28N and longitudes 92 E and 101E. The 
country is roughly in the form of a diamond. It is 920 km wide from 
east to west and 1450 km long from north to south.
The country is bordered by Thailand, Laos, China, India and 
Bangladesh. Its estimated population was 33.3million in
1979-80(Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw;1980-81,p11). It was colonised 
progressively by the British from 1826 until 1948 in which year, on 
the 4th January, Burma obtained her independence.
1.2 General situation after the second World War
After the second World War, the Burmese economy was in a very 
poor condition. Most of the capital invested during the colonial time
had been destroyed by the Japanese and British invasions. The
Japanese invasion and the 'scorched earth* policies of the British
army damaged nearly all of the existing oil fields, mines and 
infrastructure. Therefore Burma had to rely on agricultural exports 
to provide foreign exchange earnings to restart the economy after 
independence.
In 1978-79, 37 per cent of total net output of the nation was 
contributed by the agricultural sector (excluding fishery and 
livestock), and 65 per cent of the total active labour force depended
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on the agricultural sector. The nation’s per capita income was 425 
kyats.
The area under crops was 9.54 million hectares in 1979-80; 
multiple cropping took place on 1.5 million hectares. The irrigated 
area was 0.97 hectares. Rice was grown on 4.96 million hectares and 
10.3million metric tons were produced. Groundnut and sesamum were 
grown on 0.6 and 1.04 million hectares and 0.5 and 0.12 million metric 
tons were produced respectively. Pulses were grown on 0.76 million 
hectare while cotton was grown on 0.2 million hectares.
Three governments ruled Burma since Independence. Those 
governments have managed the economy in three different ways. The 
first government, from 1948 to 1962, can be called parliamentary 
government and it allowed the free market economic system to operate 
to a greater extent than the other two governments.
On March 2, 1962, the Revolutionary Council under General Ne Win 
assumed state power. The Burmese Way to Socialism was declared on 
April 30, 1962 and the Burmese Socialist Programme Party was 
established. The Council ruled until 1973. On 3rd January 1974 the 
Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma was 
promulgated. At this time the Revolutionary Council transferred power 
to the Pyithu HluttawCNational Assembly). From 1962-74 the government 
followed a highly inward looking economic policy, and trade and the 
principal means of production were nationalised.
From 1974 onwards, with the Pyithu Hluttaw in power, there have 
been some relaxations in government control of the economy, for 
example, some private investment is now allowed. There have been
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improvements in relationships with foreign contries and the government 
now accepts more foreign aid and grants than previous governments. 
The government now follows a more outward looking economic policy.
1.3 Objectives of the study
One of the major differences between the three governments has 
been the way they have reacted to economic problems. All faced 
balance of payments problems. The middle government’s reaction was to 
become inward looking and to try to diversify agriculture toward 
import replacement crops. The third government also wished to 
diversify agriculture, but took a more outward looking approach in 
which it tried to diversify exports as well.
The aim of this study is to identify the changes that have 
occured in agricultural production and exports since independence. 
Price policy is examined to see if that could have affected the 
observed changes. Other factors are considered as well.
1.4 Outline of the study
Following this introductory chapter, the study is organised into 
six further chapters. Chapter 2 present a theoretical discussion 
about the effects of exports on growth. The effects of export 
concentration is also considered. In Chapter 3, a general outline of 
the three governments’ policies is presented. Prices changes in the 
agricultural sector are discussed in Chapter 4.
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Price changes and the relative profitability of different crops 
determines the level and pattern of agricultural production, given the 
technical constraints of soils and climate. But data on cropping 
patterns, marketed surpluses, profitability and farm incomes are very 
scanty in Burma. Aggregate changes in the pattern of production are 
analysed in Chapter 5.
These changes can affect exportable surpluses. Export trends, 
the composition of exports and the direction of exports are outlined 
in chapter 6. Chapter 7 contains a summary of the main conclusions.
1.5 The data
The data used in this study are secondary data, obtained from 
various official sources and international publications. Because of 
difficulties in finding a consistent source, sometimes the data 
presented in the study are unavoidably mixed from different sources. 
At all times that data are presented, the source is also mentioned.
However, there are some problems of comparability between the 
different sources. These are identified clearly and attempts are made 
to resolve any problem. However, it must be remembered that much of 
these data are not particularly reliable. They are used to illustrate 
trends rather than to obtain precise estimates.
There are also problems arising out of the extension of 
statistical coverage to additional regions. These problems 
particularly affect attempts to compare trends between the 1930’s and 
I960’s, such as the growth in the irrigated area throughout the 
country. In the mid-1960's statistical coverage was progressively
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extended to provide estimates of agricultural production in the 
frontier areas, which had not been covered either in the colonial 
period or in the first two decades of independence. Therefore, to 
allow comparison of similar areas over time, in many Tables 
administrative areas have been grouped as they were in the colonial 
period , simply for statistical convenience.
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Chapter 2
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INDUSTRIALIZATION 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
2.1 Introduction
Developing countries depend on foreign trade policy as a major 
instrument for economic development.In the context of economic growth 
there are two major policy questions. How trade-oriented should a 
developing economy aim to be and what might be the optimum composition 
of exports to aim for?
This chapter discusses the role of foreign trade in economic 
development. It also states the brief outline of theory on the 
interrelationship between trade and growth and then discusses the 
objective of trade policy in many developing countries.
2.2 Trade and growth
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, a number of 
present day developing countries followed closely the simple Ricardian 
model of comparative advantage in expanding output of a few 
commodities for export. At the same time they were reducing or 
phasing out many other activities (such as crafts and cottage 
industry) for which their costs were comparatively higher than 
imported goods and substituting imports. According to this model of 
comparative advantage, through price mechanism and free trade policy, 
both trade partners gain in aggregate welfare from such trade, 
assuming perfect competition , free movement of factors within each 
country and taking transport costs into account. Because of trade and
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specialization the trading countries achieve economies of scale and 
gains can be made not only through taking advantage of differing 
relative cost structures but also through decreasing costs, as each 
country enlarges the scale of its production in the goods of 
specialization.
This theory was extended in the Hecksher-Ohlin model to take 
relative factor endowments into account. According to this theory 
countries in which labour or land is relatively abundant export 
labour- or land-intensive products, and those with relatively abundant 
capital export capital-intensive products. In the long run incomes in 
both countries will tend to equalize as well as income within each 
country.
2.3 Export specialization and economic growth
John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall both regarded the expansion 
of international trade as an escape valve for domestic industry, which 
averted economic stagnation in the supplying country by providing 
markets for surplus production overseas. For nineteenth century 
Europe they were right , in that trade abetted growth rather than 
discouraging it. For many of the underdeveloped countries of today, 
however, an expansion of foreign trade does not seem to have helped 
very much to raise domestic standards of living.
In Ragnar Nurkse's reading of nineteenth century history, it was 
held that the large increases in the exports of countries of recent 
settlement, mostly lying in temperate latitudes outside Europe, were 
attributable mainly to favourable demand conditions. It was the
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tremendous expansion of Western Europe’s, and especially Great 
Britain’s, demand for foodstuffs and raw materials that provided the 
basic inducement that caused them to develop. In this context , trade 
in nineteenth century was indeed an "engine of growth".
The relationship between trade and growth for developing 
countries in the post war period has been statistically tested by 
Emery(1967) , MaizelsC1968), Kravis(1970) and MichaelyC1977) by 
examining the correlation between the variables which represent these 
two magnitudes of aggregate economic performance. In all tests the 
two variables are found to be significantly correlated.
Foreign trade orientation of countries tends to be linked with 
their size. Small countries are usually more trade-oriented since 
their population are relatively small and can create only limited 
domestic markets and also small geographic area may provide only a 
limited range of natural resources. Larger countries, by contrast, 
have bigger domestic markets even at the same or lower level of income 
and usually possess a greater range of inputs within their borders.
Large countries with varied resources and large population are 
therefore generally more self-reliant than small ones. But even small 
countries which have ample food supplies, like Burma, can afford to be 
more self-reliant than those who must import essential staples.
According to Haberler(1959:352-8) benefits to countries newly 
specializing in trade were not merely static advantages obtained from 
a better allocation of their resources which raised national income. 
International trade also produced dynamic flow-on benefits in that it 
was usually accompanied by an inflow of knowledge and the acquisition
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of new skills and often by an inflow of capital also. These together 
gradually transformed the production functions that had been created 
by the specialization.
Many modern economists, however, dispute the value for developing 
countries of following export promoting sti itegies for growth, 
especially if they concentrate on raw materials exports. For example, 
Kravis suggests that an overemphasis on the single factor, trade, both 
raises false expectations of the gains from trade and conceals real 
potential gains that might be made if more sophisticated development 
strategies were adopted. According to Kravis the term "handmaiden of 
growth " better conveys the notion of the role that trade can play in 
promoting development than " engine of growth "(Kravis, 1970:869).
Some economists have gone as far as to argue that international 
trade , far from encouraging the growth of developing countries , has 
actually retarded their development(Baran, 1962). According to this 
view, the disadvantage and risks of a heavy emphasis on foreign trade 
in the growth stretagy are so great that a more inward-looking 
strategy is preferable. That insulates the domestic economy as far as 
possible from the transmission of adverse trends in the world economy.
This attitude is partly created by a desire to throw off the 
dominance of foreign interests , which often make politically 
independent states continue to be economically dependent. It is also 
because foreign interests affect the distribution of national income 
within less-developed countries. Thus gains to domestic factors from 
the economic activities of foreign firms will tend to flow to the 
already wealthier classes.
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Even if an export strategy is followed by a country, a Ricardian 
model has many disadvantages. In particular, it is argued that it is 
static rather than dynamic and locks the underdeveloped countries into 
one model of growth where they should be constantly changing their 
economic structures to adapt to new world price relationships. Other 
disadvantages are as follows.
First, it creates a lopsided form of development. A 
commercialized export sector, usually supplying agricultural 
commodities and raw materials, grows separately from the remainder of 
the economy. It is this lopsidedness of structure which occurred 
during the growth of the export economies that has led to much 
argument about the need for "balanced growth " amongst planners in 
less-developed countries.
Second, the backward linkage from the export sector to other 
sectors of the economy will be weak since unsophisticated production 
needs few inputs apart from land and labour. Therefore there will be 
little benefit flowing from the commercialised export sector to the 
economic hinterland in providing additional markets for its goods and 
services. The hinterland continues its subsistence production without 
changing technologies.
Thirdly, the hinterland may be worse off than before, because it 
is forced to curtail or drop economic activities which have been 
replaced by cheaper imports. This may be one reason why regional 
disparities in income tend to worsen during the course of development.
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In studies of the Economic Commission for Europe, Myrdal reports 
that regional disparities are greater in poor countries than rich 
countries and disparites are increasing in poor countries and 
decreasing in rich ones. The explanation for these two correlations 
is that the higher the level of economic development that a country 
has already attained, the stronger the spread effects will be. Thus , 
it is entirely possible for international trade to have a " strong 
backwash effect on the underdeveloped countries.” (Gunnar 
Myrdal:1957,p 29)
Fourth, forward linkage in practice rarely takes place in the raw 
material supplying countries to any significant extent. Only simple 
processing industries such as rice mills have been developed in those 
countries. This is particularly the case of those countries where the 
export sector is dominated by foreign interests. They tend to invest 
profits "downstrean" in the usually developed countries of 
consumption.
Lastly, it has been argued that over the longer term, the terms 
of trade move against primary products in favour of industrial goods. 
This argument has been put forward forcefully by Prebisch(1959:p251). 
He argues that the uneven spread of technical progress has contributed 
to a division in the world economy between the industrialised centres 
and the peripheral countries. In the industrialised centres, 
technical progress has been rapid and in the peripheral, raw material 
suppliers, it has been relatively slow. Contrary to the classical 
theory of pure competition, technical progress in manufactures, which 
lowered their costs, did not reduce their prices relatively to primary 
commodities. A reverse price movement has taken place, so that
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developing countries suffer from adverse terms of trade 
(ibid:p26l-264).
The explanation for this contradictory movement in price ratio is 
generally the low income elasticity of demand for the primary 
commodities exported by the less developed countries. This low 
elasticity is mainly caused by the operation of Engel’s law in that 
demand for items of basic consumption, especially foodstuffs, declines 
as a share of total personal expenditures as income increases and that 
for less essential consumption rises. Apart from this, low elasticity 
is caused by the technical progress in utilization of raw material and 
the development of alternative supplies. Such progress tends to 
reduce the share of material in the final products, to raise the 
efficiency of primary production in the developed countries themselves 
and to invent synthetic substitutes for natural materials.
The theory of low elasticity of demand for primary products 
relative to manufactures in international markets was one important 
reason why many planners favoured industrialization in the developing 
countries in the early 1950s. Other reasons were employment creation 
for growing labour forces and to correct an unbalanced economic 
structure distorted in the colonial period by the development of 
primary product export enclaves.
The terms of trade argument was particularly stressed as a long 
term strategy to improve the balance of payments since unfavourable 
trade balances were generally major constraints on development. In 
this view, short term costs (either foreign exchange or domestic ) 
through tariff protection, quotas etc. would be worthwhile to
establish infant industries which would save foreign exchange, net,
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when fully established. This in turn led to import substitution 
strategies since the domestic markets most easy for "infant 
industries" to capture were those already in existence and supplied by 
imports.
This policy set has generally been called Tinward-looking* and is 
linked to concepts of self-reliance as well as to those of political 
and economic independence of foreign influence as far as possible.
Criticism of growth strategies based on supplying primary 
products for world markets has generally strong support amongst 
economists and planners from less-developed countries. The support is 
reinforced by their political suspicions of the dependent role to 
which their countries have been consigned.
Nevertheless, others argue that this role is part of a 
transitional stage in economic development and that it is preferable 
for those countries to follow the growth path of specialization and 
comparative advantage until they develop the skills and acquire the 
capital to change the pattern.
Among modern economists, Myint is perhaps the best known as an 
early proponent of export-led("outward-looking") growth strategies for 
developing countries, especially those of the smaller Southeast Asian 
countries. They had already followed this model during the pre-world 
war II period, mainly under colonial rule. Myint suggests that the 
reaction against a colonial type economic structure had gone too far 
in the newly independent countries. Such countries would sooner or 
later be forced to face the realities of their situation.
(a) foreign aid could not, however optimistically assessed,be
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relied on to provide more than a marginal share of funds to 
finance their development; the bulk must be raised domestically 
by the developing countries themselves.
(b) countries could pay the costs of their development plans mainly 
either by cutting back their less essential imports, thus turning 
to greater self sufficiency, or by promoting exports to earn 
additional foreign exchange.
(c) initially at least these exports had to be raw materials for
which they held a differential advantage in the nineteenth
century, although not necessarily the same commodities.
(d) export of manufactured goods might come later as development 
plans succeeded (Myint, 1958:pp337-338 and 1954-55).
2.4 The composition of exports
The last section illustrated the dispute in the development 
literature about whether countries should follow an export oriented or 
an inward looking strategy. In this section, arguments about the 
composition of export are considered.
Specialization in products for which countries have comparative
advantage has often led to extreme concentration of exports in
developing countries, as have trade links between peripheral
(colonial) countries and industrial (metropolitan) markets. Such
concentration has of course the advantage that in theory it means the 
most profitable use of a country's resource endowments and of its most 
accessible markets. In practice, too, expanding an existing activity 
is usually the best short-term option, since the trade is already 
established with its investment, infrastructure, labour skills and
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trade contacts.
Many countries, however,aimed in post-war planning to diversify 
their trade patterns.The objective was both to extend the range of 
primary products and to diversify away from primary products to 
semi-processed goods and manufactures. The reasons were partly of 
risk insurance and partly of likely growth prospects.
(1) that dependence on one or few goods had higher risk than 
dependence on many- i.e. the desire not "to have all one’s eggs 
in one basket" ;
(2) that prices were likely to be more volatile for one product than 
for a range of products;
(3) that contraction of one market outlet was more likely than of 
several;
(4) that if a country supplied a significant share of world trade of 
exports of one commodity,such as rice for example, a large 
increase in its shipments might reduce world prices;and
(5) that since terms of trade for primary products seemed
unfavourable compared to manufactures, in the longer run
expansion of exports would be best in more highly processed 
forms.
One of the best known studies of trade concentration has been 
made by Michaely(1962) on the basis of 1954 data for 44 countries. 
Michaely’s analysis as far as it affects Burma and details of his 
formula for measuring trade concentrations will be found in chapter(6)
on Burma’s foreign trade.
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Michaely( 1962:6-25,124-131) found that:(1)commodity concentration 
was generally higher for exports than for imports;(2) it was generally 
greater in primary producing countries than in industrial 
ones;(3)export prices between 1945 and 1954 were not notably more 
volatile for primary products than manufactures;(4)export values were 
generally more volatile in less-developed countries than in industrial 
ones, the apparent discrepancy between(3) and(4) being explained by 
the greater commodity concentration of exports in the former 
countries;(5)fluctuations in export income had greater repercussions 
on national incomes and savings margins in poor countries;(6)commodity 
exports were more concentrated in less developed countries with 
population over 10 million than in smaller ones, contrary to what 
might have been expected;(7)the higher the commodity concentration of 
exports, the stronger the geographic concentration and (8)the further 
the distance of a country from world centre of trade, the more 
concentrated its export pattern.
There is,however, some debate about these results. Specifically 
the link between export concentration and economic growth is not 
clear (a). Lim(1976), however, lends support to the belief that 
instability would be lowered by export diversification, which in turn 
could have beneficial effects on economic growth.
a Many studies have been unable to show a link between concentration 
and growth e.g. MacBean(1967). However Lim(1976) argues they used 
the wrong approach.
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2.5 Conclusion
Not only is there a debate about whether trade is beneficial for 
growth, but there is also a debate how concentrated exports should be. 
Both views have been taken by Burmese governments at various times. 
Sometimes the government has favoured inward looking policies, and at 
other times it has been more export oriented and has tried to 
diversify exports. The changes in policy are the subject of the next 
chapter.
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Chapter 3
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT OF BURMA
3.1 Introduction
The pattern of economic growth during the colonial period and of 
government policies of the post war period will be discussed in this 
chapter.
Burma was a prime example of economic growth through trade during 
the colonial period. This was especially the case after 1869, when 
the opening of the Suez Canal and the development of steam shipping 
reduced the transport cost of its exports and imports. The bigger 
part of the expansion for export was the rice sector, but other 
commodity exports increased also, some of which were smallholder 
products such as pulses, raw cotton and others from the forestry and 
mining sectors. During this period imports replaced many local 
manufactures, notably textiles(Mali;1962,p14).
In the colonial period there was always a large favourable 
balance of foreign trade, with exports usually running nearly double 
the value of imports in the mid-1930s. For example in 1937-38 total 
exports were 189 million dollars and imports were 103 million 
dollars(Andrus;1956,ppl67-177). Over 6 per cent of Gross Domestic 
Product was remitted overseas in dividends, interests and remittances 
of foreign workers in 1938 (National Income of Burma;1956).
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By the 1920s about half the rice crop was exported annually and 
exports from foreign enterprise sectors had increased greatly. Burma 
became one of the most export-oriented of the world economies. 
Exports contributed about 33 per cent of Gross Domestic Product in 
1938. Between 1937 and 1941 rice contributed 47 per cent of export 
earnings and other exports of indigeneous enterprise 5 per cent. But 
exports of western enterprise, such as petroleum, teak and mining, 
contributed 45 per cent, since their prices held up better in the 
world trade depression of the 1930s than those of agricultural 
products.
A large share of export went to a single country, India, which 
accounted for about the 55 per cent of total exports of Burma in the 
1934-8 annual average. India dominated the export trade of Burma in 
pre-war period because, (1) Indian ports were nearest to the Burmese 
ports; (2) India was deficient in supplies of rice, teak and 
petroleum which were the exportable surplus commodities of Burma; (3) 
there was free trade between two countries; (4) currencies of both 
countries were the same; (5)the internal and external trade of Burma 
were largely in the hands of Indians (Andrus;1956,p167).
During the colonial period there were two major disruptions to 
the economy. The first was the world trade depression of the 1930s 
which hit the rice sector particularly severly. The second disruption 
was World War II. Great physical damage was caused by the ’’scorched 
earth” policies of the British and Japanese armies, especially to the 
infrastructure and the mining installations in Upper Burma and the
hills. After Second World War, gross and per capita G.D.P. in
1946-47 had fallen to 61 per cent and 57 per cent respectively
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compared to 1938-39 base.
Mining had ceased in most of the hill areas and could not be 
restored owing to the lack of security in the regions. Security was 
also lacking in part of the teak forests and many of the elephants who 
worked the forests had been lost.
These disruptions determined to an extent, the policies which 
could be followed when Burma gained independence. The only industry 
which could provide large export earnings was rice, which had also 
suffered during the war. The policies followed by successive 
governments after independence are considered in the next section.
3.2 Post-war period (1948-80)
Foreign trade policy from independence in 1948 up to 1980 can be 
divided into three broad periods. First, the Parliamentary Government 
period from 1948 to March 1962, when inward-looking policies were 
followed. Second, the Revolutionary Council Government period from 
March 1962 onward, when, after two years of hesitation, such policies 
were tightened to approach self-reliance. Third, the Pyithu Hluttaw 
Government period from 1973 to date when more outward-looking policies 
were adopted to a limited extent.
3.2.1 The Parliamentary Government (1948- 1962)
Foreign trade in rice and some other agricultural products was 
nationalised in 1948 (Chapter 6). Initially after independence was 
granted in 1948, the government tried to follow comparatively
outward-looking policies. Rice was the dominant export item and
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provided the bulk of foreign exchange to finance imports.
However, after the Korean War boom, Burma found it increasingly 
difficult to find markets for her rice. This led to foreign exchange 
problems, and government policy became increasingly inward-looking. 
It favoured import substitution, but also encouraged the 
diversification of the economy away from rice.
3.2.2 The Revolutionary Council Government (1962-73)
In March 1962, the Revolutionary Council took over power and 
economic policies were changed. But the major effects started only in 
196-4 in which year all large scale trade, internal and external, was 
nationalised and the export sector was entirely monopolised by the 
government.
Planning was again emphasised in order to modernise and develop 
the economy. The aim was to develop both industry and agriculture so 
as to increase the country’s self reliance.
"The Union of Burma is an economically backward 
agricultural country. The national productive 
forces need to be continuously developed to build 
up socialist economy. That is why various 
productions that would be compatable with existing 
conditions and time will have to be planned and 
developed. While modernizing the agricultural 
production which forms the main basis of the 
national economy such industries as would be 
commensurate with the national resources and 
capabilities of the country will also be 
developed. In doing so national private 
enterprises which contribute to national 
productive forces will be allowed with fair and 
reasonable restrictions"(Burma Socialist Programme 
Party; 1963,p49).
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The problems and difficulties that the government faced in that 
period were mentioned in BSPP’s Long-terms and Short-terms Economic 
Policies Guidlines, 1974 (in Burmese) as following.
-Departments had been implementing the policies that they 
thought of as the best without compromising between 
departments to obtain the consistent policies between them. 
-In government departments and public enterprises, 
management was implemented not from the economic efficiency 
point of view but from the administrative.
-Because of financial difficulties faced by the government, 
the commodities* prices had to be raised and cost of living 
increased.
-Although public investment were increased because of the 
lack of allowing private investment, total investment 
decreased.
-Because of no private investment and lc rt labour absorbing 
from public sector, there were high unemployment ratio and 
black market appeared.
-In the employment system, the priority had been given to 
administrative sector. Therefore the cost of administration 
increased and on the other hand the commodity production did 
not increase significantly compared to the population 
increases.
-There were weak economic relationship with foreign 
countries.
The facts mentioned above caused farm prices to fall and the 
productivity of the agricultural sector was affected. Exports
decreased during the period and the government faced a foreign
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exchange shortage.
This forced the government to rely on the self-reliance or 
inward-looking policies. The government emphasized the need to 
diversify agriculture. And also invested in import substituting 
industries which used domestic raw materials.
3.2.3 Pyithu Hluttaw Government (1973-1980)
This government has attempted to learn from previous experiences. 
It has drawn more realistic objectives aimed at achieving economic 
development.
The new policy objectives and guidelines were based on the 
consistent economic policies between sectors, balanced growth, 
economic efficiency, productivity, permission for private investment 
and better economic relationships with foreign countries.
A twenty year plan was drawn which specified the relationship 
between the public sector, co-operative sector and private sector. 
The government sought to stimulate private investment. One of the
main objectives was to diversify the economy instead of depending on 
one or two commodities.
The government follows the following priorities to achieve the 
economic development(BSPP;197M,pp17—18).
First priority: to expand the production of agriculture, fishery and
forestry sectors and to promote exports expansion.
Second priority: Import-substituting consumers' goods industries to
be established based on the production of agriculture, 
fishery and forestry sectors.
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Third priority: to establish heavy industries based on the production
of mining sector where the mineral resources must be 
produced as much as possible.
In relation to the first, the government is particularly 
interested in diversifying exports away from the dominant position of 
rice.
3.3 Conclusions
At various times since independence, export diversification has 
been emphasized by governments as a way of reducing the vulnerability 
of primary products to fluctuations in world markets. The 1950-62 
period experienced surpluses of rice production and difficulty of 
finding markets after the Korean War boom so that the government 
switched to policies of import substitution and self sufficiency.
All the governments since independence have sought to diversify 
production in Burma so that the economy was not so dependent on rice. 
The first two did this in the context of inward-looking strategies. 
The present government is more outward looking, and therefore has 
sought to diversify exports as well.
One of the ways of achieving this is through price policies. 
Changes in real prices since independence and their effect on farm 
profitability are examined in the next chapter. Changes in 
agricultural production and in exports are the subjects of Chapter 5 
and 6 respectively.
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Chapter 4
PRICE POLICY AND GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
4.1 Introduction
Price policy is a vital component of the planning process. This 
is particularly true in socialist countries which have a large 
privately controlled agricultural sector divided into many small scale 
farms. If the government cannot control the bulk of production and 
marketing, either directly or indirectly, price policy may be its most 
effective instrument to influence the volume and composition of output 
of farm produce and its utilization. The aims of government price 
policies are outlined in section 4.2.
In the case of Burma, rice price policy is a key issue, since 
rice is the principal crop, the chief export earner and the staple 
food of the people. Rice price policy has been important for 
governments from independence onwards. This is the topic of section
4.3.
From 1962 the government has also sought to influence the 
composition of total agricultural output by altering prices of other 
agricultural crops. This is considered in section 4.4.
The limited information on farm profitability is examined in 
section 4.5. The final section summarizes the conclusions.
4.2 Aims of agricultural price policy
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From 1948 government agricultural price policies have had four 
main aims. A fifth was added after 1962. These objectives often 
tended to clash.
The main objectives of policy were:
(1) to offer rice farmers an incentive price which would encourage 
full use of their resources of land and labour;
(2) to prevent fluctuations in world rice export prices from 
destabilizing the domestic economy. In particular to protect rice 
farmers from the abrupt price changes both between seasons and within 
seasons that occurred in the colonial period;
(3) to keep retail prices of milled rice low for domestic consumers 
(This was mainly for the urban areas, since many farm labourers 
receive part of their wages in paddy). This policy was followed 
partly for welfare reasons and partly to prevent rising food prices 
from forcing up wages in other sectors of the economy, which would 
check development;
(4) to extract a surplus from the agricultural sector to help capital 
formation in other sectors, first to reconstruct and then to modernize 
and diversify the economy.
and, from 1962,
(5) to change the farm product mix. This was first to promote import 
replacement crops in the self reliance strategy. Later, priority was 
switched back to rice.
These were the aims. What actually happened is considered in the 
next sections. Rice prices are examined first.
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Table 4.1
Paddy Production, Procurement and Prices
Season Production Government Current Current Index(b)
procurement procurement market (deflated
(2)/(1) prices prices prices)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(m.t.) (m. t.) % (ks/mt) Index
(a)
(ks/mt) Index
(a)
1950-51 5393 2290 43 137 100 158 100
1951-52 5588 2474 44 137 100 158 100
1952-53 5820 3072 53 137 100 158 100
1953-54 5666 2523 45 137 100 158 100
1954-55 5588 2519 45 137 100 158 100 111
1955-56 5698 2489 44 137 100 158 100 103
1956-57 6103 2680 44 137 100 158 100 99
1957-58 5301 2590 49 137 100 158 100 97
1958-59 6580 3243 49 137 100 165 104 98
1959-60 6851 2549 37 137 100 165 104 106
1960-61 6608 3026 46 137 100 186 118 98
1961-62 6486 3022 46 149 109 153 97 103
1962-63 7665 3455 45 149 109 169 107 107
1963-64 7790 4069 52 149 109 162 103 113
1964-65 8507 4078 48 149 109 157 99 113
1965-66 8055 3291 41 149 109 149 94 100
1966-67 6635 2159 33 163 119 168 106 87
1967-68 7769 2276 29 171 125 212 134 93
1968-69 8022 2982 37 171 125 536 339 86
1969-70 7985 3022 38 177 129 248 157 88
1970-71 8162 2253 28 177 129 286 181 94
1971-72 8175 2253 28 183 134 547 346 93
1972-73 7357 1228 17 210 153 591 374 99
1973-74 8601 1508 17 431 315 741 469 181
1974-75 8583 2632 31 431 315 756 479 138
1975-76 9207 2787 30 431 315 690 437 105
1976-77 9319 2935 32 431 315 588 372 86
1977-78 9461 2282 24 431 315 744 471 87
1978-79 10528 3859 27 446 326 96
1979-80 10448 3580 34 446 326 91
1980-81 13317 3755 28 446 326
(a) 1950-51 = 100
(b) Government procurement price index deflated by CPI.
Sources: Paris and others 1980,Report to the People
1971-72 Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw 1981-82.
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4.3 Paddy prices and procurement
After independence the State Agricultural Marketing Board(SAMB) 
was set up. It was able to dominate rice marketing, through direct 
purchasing and milling of paddy, and through millers or wholesalers it 
licensed(Richter;1969).
There are no firm estimates of the size of marketable surpluses 
of rice in Burma. But it appears that almost all commercial sales of 
ordinary grades of paddy were made at official prices up to the 
1960’s, the remainder - around half the crop - being retained for 
farmers’ own use (Richter, ibid).
Each year the Board announced a basic paddy procurement price for 
Ngasein, the most common variety grown in Lower Burma. This was set 
at K137 a ton in 1950 and left unchanged until 1960-61, apart from 
small premiums for quality given from 1959 onwards. By 1972-3 the 
procurement price had reached K210 a ton. Details are found in Table 
4.1. The table also shows that even though money prices rose steadily 
during the 1960s, real prices remained low during the 1950’s and fell 
after 1964-5. These figures suggest that if the period to 1973-4 is 
taken as a whole, the terms of trade probably moved against the rice 
farmers. Certainly they did not improve.
Then in 1973-4 there was a change in government policy, to try to 
offer real incentive prices and stimulate production and deliveries. 
The basic price was more than doubled to K431 a ton. However it was 
kept there until 1977-8. Since then there have been only small 
increases. Thus real procurement prices have fallen steadily since
1973-4.
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The ratio of the free market to the official procurement price is 
examined in Table 4.2. Up to the mid-1960’s the premium offered on 
the free market over official prices was fairly low and was apparently 
insufficient to compensate most farmers for the inconvenience and/or 
illegality of selling outside official channels. However, free market 
premiums rose to an average of 74 per cent over official prices 
between 1962-73. This change probably accounts for the fact that the 
proportion of total rice production sold to the government, which 
remained around 46 per cent until 1965, declined steadily after that. 
It was only 17 per cent in the years 1972-3 and 1973-4.
Table 4.1 shows that the large increase in prices in 1973-4 could 
have had two effects. Firstly it may have been responsible for the 
partial recovery in the proportion sold to the government. This 
averaged 29 per cent between 1973-4 and 1980-81. It also may have 
been partly responsible for the steady increase in total production 
since 1974-5. These possible effects are considered in the next 
chapter.
Table 4.2
Average Procurement Prices, Average Free Market Prices
and their Ratios
Average procure­
ment prices 
(K/ton)
Average free 
market prices 
(K/ton)
APP/AFMP
1950-62 138 161 1.17
1962-73 168 293 1.74
1973-80 435 704 a 1.62
a 1973-78 average 
Source: Table 4.1
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This analysis shows that the price the government offered rice 
producers did not keep pace with inflation over most of the period 
since independence. The exception in 1973-4 when the government 
seemed to realise the importance of pricing policies and more than 
doubled the price. However, the real price has fallen significantly 
since then. This suggests that objective one in the previous section 
was not very important.
4.4 Comparison of real prices between different crops
Government procurement prices for the major non-rice crops are 
given in Table 4.3. These are deflated by the CPI and averaged for 
the three periods since independence in Table 4.4. This table allows 
some comparison with rice to be made, although without information on 
gross and net returns per hectare and the degree of riskiness in 
altering crop patterns, it is of only limited use. It does show the 
volatility of prices of oilseed crops. This was due to shortages, 
partly caused by occasional import restrictions on edible oils and 
partly by unfavourable weather. Cotton and jute prices were both 
stable for long periods, since they were mainly purchased for state
factories.
Table 4.3
Government Procurement Prices 
(Kyats / metric ton)
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Season Pulses
(Gram)
Groundnut Sesamum Jute(gradell) Cotton(M5/M6) 
Grade I
1954-55 202 498 779 918 796
1955-56 287 540 705 918 521
1956-57 351 597 746 612 576
1957-58 299 592 1082 612 606
1958-59 322 596 907 612 538
1959-60 337 651 758 815 527
1960-61 432 631 860 815 845
1961-62 475 618 823 815 698
1962-63 361 519 800 815 734
1963-64 256 529 817 766 734
1964-65 256 529 817 766 734
1965-66 256 529 817 766 73«
1966-67 332 791 1837 766 734
1967-68 573 1411 1637 766 734
1968-69 422 1444 2026 766 73«
1969-70 421 1344 1912 766 734
1970-71 447 911 1469 766 734
1971-72 386 958 1342 766 734
1972-73 674 2210 3140 766 980
1973-74 1095 2469 3122 1072 1838
1974-75 1118 2557 3184 1072 1838
1975-76 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1976-77 3166 5855 8059 1347 1838
1977-78 2449 7275 7553 1623 3674
1978-79 3162 4762 5698 1623 3674
1979-80 3521 5205 6303 1623 3674
Source:Agricultural Statistics, various issues, 
1963-64 to 1978-79.
Page 32
Table 4.4
Real Procurement Price Indices of Major Crops 
1965- 66=100
1954-62 1962-73 1973-80
Paddy 102 98 112
Pulses(Gram) 149 136 324
Groundnut 127 163 309
Sesamum 115 157 242
Jute 114 92 67
Cotton 99 95 135
Source: Calculated from data of
Agricultural Statistics 1963-64 to 
1978-79 and Central Statistical 
Organization
These tables show that the government from 1962-73 seemed to take 
steps to increase the real price of sesamum and groundnuts. This is 
consistent with its policy of import substitution. The real price of 
all other commodities fell, however, during this period.
As with rice, the procurement prices of all commodities were 
increased significantly in 1973-4. More significant rises occured 
later with sesamum, groundnuts and cotton. However, in the last two 
years for which data are available, the money prices of cotton and 
jute have been stationary, and those of sesamum and groundnuts have 
actually fallen. Only the real price of pulses seems to have 
increased.
4.5 Gross returns of agricultural crops in different regions
Farmers’ behaviour is determined by profitability and risk rather 
than simply by market prices. The limited information available on 
profitability is considered in this section.
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The only recent figures which consider costs as well as returns 
compare local varieties of rice with High Yield Varieties (HYVs) in 
surveys carried out in Lower Burma by the Agriculture Corporation in 
1980-81. These are reproduced in Table 4.5. It shows clearly that 
the availability of HYVs made rice farming vastly more profitable. 
In spite of higher material and labour costs, the much higher yields 
of the HYV’S raised farmers gross margins per hectare by 165 per cent 
compared to traditional varieties. This was in spite of the fact that 
the traditional varieties grown were generally of higher quality and 
thus obtained slightly higher prices per tonne. The consequent 
adoption of HYVs by more and more farmers, where technical conditions 
permitted, is probably the main cause of the recent increase in rice 
production noted earlier, although increased official paddy prices may 
also have played a role.
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Table 4.5
Cost and Returns of HYV Rice and Traditional Technology,
Burma, 1980-81 
Kyats per hectare
Items Local HYV
Total Costs 804(100) 1152(100)
Total Material Costs 77(9.5) 194(16.8)
Seeds 30(3.7) 44(3.8)
Fertilizer 20(2.5) 76(6.6)
Manure 26(3.2) 67(5.8)
Pesticides 1(0.1) 7(0.6)
Total Labour Costs 582(72.4) 776(67.4)
Land preparation 
Pulling, seedling and
218(27.1) 273(23.7)
transplanting 150(18.6) 183(15.1)
Weeding 16(2.0) 30(2.6)
Crop maintenance 32(4.0) 89(7.7)
Harvesting and threshing 167(20.7) 201(17.4)
Cost of Cattle 145(18.0) 182(15.8)
Gross Returns 946 1529
Gross Margin 142 377
Source: Based on data from Agricultural Corporation, 
reproduced from Jayasuriya, 1983-
The only data on other crops are the gross returns per hectare 
calculated by using yields and prices given in Agricultural 
Statistics. These calculations are in Table 4.6. There are no data 
on costs but the technology of growing most non-rice crops has not 
shown much change over recent decades, either in labour use or 
material inputs, so that a useful comparison in trends over time can 
be gained from the table. Exceptions are maize and groundnuts for 
which higher yielding seed has become available.
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Table 4.6
Gross Returns per hectare, Various Crops, in Different 
Regions (a) (Kyats), and Indices (1960-1 = 100)
Lower Burma
1960-1 1965-66 1970-71 1977-78
Paddy 93 (100) 106(114) 126(135) 334(359)
Gram(pulses) 97 (100) 65( 67) 105(108) 549(566)
Sesamum 65(100) 63( 97) 129(198) 680(1046)
Groundnut 269(100) 195( 72) 343(128) 2546(946)
Cotton - - - -
Jute 403(100) 178( 44) 205(51) 562(139)
Maize 37(100) 119(322) 106(286) 918(2481)
Sugarcane 306(100) 337(110) 413(135) 1318(431)
Upper Burma
Paddy 65(100) 82(126) 103(158) 329(506)
Gram 63(100) 50(79) 81(129) 546(867)
Sesamum 48(100) 38(79) 79(165) 483(1006)
Groundnut 189(100) 161(56) 312(108) 2779(962)
Cotton 35(100) 18(51) 13(37) 217(620)
Jute 244(100) 151(62) 113(46) 409(168)
Maize 30(100) 61(203) 81(270) 537(1790)
Sugarcane 266(100) 329(124) 361(136) 1448(554)
States
Paddy 85(100) 74(87) 92(108) 228(268)
Gram 184(100) 97(53) 191(104) 470(255)
Sesamum 6 1(1 0 0) 173(284) 419(687) 959(1572)
Groundnut 251(100) 215(86) 831(331) 2670(1064)
Cotton - - - -
Jute - - - _
Maize 80(100) 77(96) 52(65) 646(808)
Sugarcane 319(100) 446(140) 468(147) 1015(318)
(a) Details of regions are given in Appendices C1-3.
Source:Calculated from Agricultural Statistics, various issues.
Most of the increase in paddy returns since 1970-1 must be due to 
the large increases in procurement prices, but is also partly 
attributable to the improved yields of HYV’s. (It must be remembered 
that, for technical reasons, the overall spread of HYV rices 
throughout Burma was limited at this period, so reducing their general
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impact on regional average returns). However basic yields of most 
other crops have changed little apart from seasonal fluctuations due 
to weather. For these crops the price increases outlined earlier are 
largely responsible for higher returns. These data are not, however, 
very useful in understanding whether farmers could have changed 
cropping patterns, either between rice ond non-rice or between various 
non-rice alternatives, because cost details are not available, nor can 
physical constraints and risks be taken into account.
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4.6 Conclusions
For the years to 1973-4, the real price of most crops in Burma 
either fell or did not rise. The major exceptions are groundnuts and 
sesamum.
The procurement prices for all crops were raised substantially in 
1973-4. This took the real price of all crops except jute to well 
above what they had been ten years earlier. Since then the real 
prices of most crops have stayed relatively constant. The exceptions 
are rice and jute whose real prices have fallen back to 1972 levels, 
and pulses which have continued to have real price increases.
It was not possible to determine the exact effect of these price 
movements on profitability. However it was shown that the 
introduction of HYV’s for rice increased profitability significantly.
In the next chapter, changes in production are considered. An 
attempt is made to examine the effect of the price policies outlined 
here. But it must be remembered that data on the share of output 
required by farmers for subsistence are not available. It is known, 
however, to be rising as population grows and farm sizes decrease, so 
that price effects are proportionately lessened.
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Chapter 5
THE CHANGING PATTERN OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
5.1 Introduction
Changes in the volume of production and in the cropping pattern 
are due either to area or yield variations. In a socialist country 
such as Burma both of these are influenced by government policy. The 
strongest influence in Burma, apart from climate and soil, is price ■ 
policy, which was discussed in Chapter 4. In this chapter changes in 
land use, area planted and yields will be outlined.
Other government policies can also promote such changes. These 
include input subsidies, infrastructure provision, technical advice, 
provision of high yield seeds, agrarian reforms and the organization 
of farmers. These are also considered briefly.
5.2 The pattern of production
Table 5.1 shows the pattern of production by commodity, according 
to official records. As mentioned in the introduction the figures 
before 1961-2 are incomplete. They cover Divisional Burma and 
therefore do not include production in all the frontier states (a) . 
The figures after 1961-2 refer to the whole of Burma. This lack of 
early figures exaggerates the rate of growth over recent decades 
slightly, as the figures start from too low a base.
a Frontier States are Shan, Kayah, Chin and Kachin. Only parts of 
production in Kachin and Chin were recorded before 1961-2.
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Table 5.1
Commodity Pattern of Production (a) 
('000 metric tons)
1936-7 1950-1 1962-3 1964-5 1972-3 1977-8
to to to to to to
1940-1 1961-2 1963-4 1971-2 1976-7 1980-1
Paddy 7144 6015 7724 7914 8614 10938
(120) (100) (128) (132) (143) (182)
Maize n.a 47 62 55 60 111
(100) (1 3 2) (117) (128) (236)
Pulses 254 88 333 279 281 377
(289) (100) (3 7 8) (317) (3 1 9) (428)
Groundnut 184 187 384 392 419 408
( 98) (100) (205) (210) (224) (218)
Sessamum 46 48 69 94 109 146
( 96) (100) (144) (196) (227) (304)
Jute n.a 3 12 24 55 86
(100) (400) (800) (1833) (2867)
Cotton 21 10 54 45 39 54
(210) (100) (540) (450) (390) (540)
Rubber 11 13 14 13 15 15
( 85) (100) (108) (100) (115) (115)
Sugarcane 1000 826 1203 1406 1636 1782
(121) (100) (146) (170) (198) (216)
Population(million) 16.82 20.62 23.44 26.19 30.18 32.96
(a) : Figures in parentheses are index numbers,
1950-1 to 1961-2 = 100
Sources:Report to the People, 1969-70,1979-80,1980-81 and 
1982-83;Agricultural Statistics, 1963-64 to 
1975-76. Economic Development of Burma, The 
Department of Economics, University of Rangoon,
1959.
Table 5.1 shows that the recorded volume of output in the 1950fs 
was still well below the pre-World War II level for rice and other 
important crops such as pulses, cotton and sugarcane. By 1962-4 
production had, however, recovered. By 1977-81 output of paddy was 82 
per cent over the recorded 1950-62 average and 53 per cent over the 
recorded output of the colonial period (a) . Similarly pulses were 
over
four times the level of 1950-62 and oil seeds were twice to three
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times as high. New crops, jute and maize were also expanding, 
although still on a small scale.
The output situation is less favourable on a per capita basis, as 
Burma's population has doubled since 1941, when the last pre-war 
census was taken. Population had increased from then 16,824,000 by 
over 70 per cent to 28,886,000 by the 1973 census. The estimate for 
the year 1980-81 was 34,083,000(Report to the Pyithu 
Hluttaw;1981—82,p13). During the 1970s the annual rate of growth was 
estimated at 2.2 per cent(ibid).
On a per capita basis, all crops fell in 1950-62 period compared 
to the pre-war level. There were decreasing trends of per capita 
output in paddy , maize and cotton during the period of 1964 to 1977. 
But those recovered in 1977-81 period. Since independence per capita 
output of pulses decreased until the 1972-77 period. After that 
output rose, but it was still less than the pre-war level. The per 
capita production of sesamum and jute increased after 1964, but those 
of groundnut and rubber fell.
The production changes were caused by area planted or yield 
changes or both. These will be discussed in next section.
(a) An adjustment to show change in the rice crop between 
1936/7-1940/1, which takes estimates of areas unrecorded prior to 
1961-2 into account is given in Appendix A.
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5.3 Land use and diversification
Table 5.2 gives the area sown to all crops. By 1977-81 the gross 
sown area was 9.6 million hectares, 44 per cent larger than 1954-62, 
but only 27 per cent larger than 1936-41. The intensity of land use 
had risen. The multiple cropped area had tripled over the period to 
contribute nearly 16 per cent of gross area by 1977-81.
There has been a marked shift from the concentration on rice, 
taking the country as a whole. The area devoted to rice has scarcely 
changed since the colonial period, whereas that under other crops has 
expanded greatly. In 1936-41 rice occupied two third of the gross 
sown area. This gradually declined to less than 53 per cent in 
1977-81.
The extra land share has been put under other food crops, partly 
to meet the subsistence needs of farm families. In contrast, the main 
industrial crops, cotton, jute and rubber, occupied only 8.7 per cent 
of the gross sown area in the post-war period with no increases 
overtime compared with 8.3 per cent in 1936-41(Table 5.2).
Page 42
Table 5.2
Gross and Net Sown Area, Irrigated Area, All Crops 
(’000 hectares) (a)
1936-41 1954-5 1962-3 1964-5 1972-3 1977-8
average to to to to to
1961-2 1963-4 1971-2 1976-7 1980-1
1. Gross sown area
2. Multiple cropping
2 / 1  %
3. Total irrigated
area 
3 / 1  %
4. Paddy sown area
4.1 H.Y.V sown
(4.1)/4 %
4 / 1  %
5. Other crops
5 / 1  %
Maize
Pulses
Groundnut
Sessamum
Jute
Cotton
Rubber
Sugarcane
Others
7567 6670 8446
(113) (100) (127)
493 437 693
(123) (100) (159)
6.52 6.55 8.21
609 517 656
(118) (100) (127)
8.05 7.75 7.77
5017 4111 4888
(122) (100) (119)
66.30 61.63 57.87
2550 2559 3558
( 99) (100) (139)
33.65 38.39 42.13
84 70 141
594 474 714
327 398 605
562 579 637
- 7 21
182 153 245
44 52 78
26 31 43
727 795 1074
8731 9260 9606
(13D (139) (144)
976 1311 1516
(223) (300) (347)
11.18 14.16 15.78
798 940 1012
(154) (182) (196)
9.14 10.15 10.54
4939 5033 5074
(120) (122) (123)
436 753 1610
(100) (173) (369)
9 15 32
56.57 54.35 52.82
3792 4227 4532
(148) (165) (177)
43.43 45.65 47.18
155 204 234
680 695 728
573 646 533
851 1006 1158
41 82 94
198 201 197
87 84 81
72 98 102
1135 1211 1405
(a) Figures in parentheses are indices, 1954-5 to 1961-2 = 100 
Sources:Report to the People, 1970-71,1979-80 and 1982-83; 
Agricultural Statistics, 1963-64 to 1978-79.
In Table 5.3 average annual production in 1936-41 is compared to 
average annual production from 1977-81. For comparative purposes, the 
period is then divided into two sub-periods. An attempt is made to 
allocate the increase in production to increases in either yield or in
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area planted.
The following method is used to examine the contribution of yield 
and area to output.
r= rate of growth of production 
a= rate of growth of area 
y= rate of growth of yield
. . (1+a)(1+y) = (1+r)
1+a+y+ay = 1+r
It can be said that 
. . a+y = r
Because a and y are less than one and the product (ay) becomes very 
small. Therefore the contribution of area to the growth in production 
can be approximated by
a y
-------, and also for yield by --------
a + y a + y
To illustrate, from 1936-41 to 1977-81 the production of pulses
increased by 48.4 per cent. The area growth was 22.6 per cent and
yield growth rate was 20.9 per cent.
Thus the contribution of area (C.o.A) is approximately
22.6
= -----------------  = = 5255
20.9+22.6
and the contribution of yield (C.o.Y) is 
20.9
= ----------------  = =  48 £
20.9+22.6
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Table 5.3
Contribution of Area Extention and Yield Increases 
to Output Growth
1936-41 to 1977-81 1936-41 to 1964-72 1964-72to 1977-81
PGR CAE CYI PGR CAE CYI PGR CAE CYI
Paddy 45.0 2.3 97.7 4.9 -1.6 101.6 38.2 7.3 92.7
Pulses 48.4 52.0 48.0 9.8 148.0 -48.0 35.1 20.9 79.1
Groundnut 121.7 62.7 37.3 113.0 77.9 22.1 4.1 -112.9 212.9
Sesamum 217.4 62.9 37.1 104.0 57.8 42.2 55.3 66.5 33.5
Jute 2766.7 91.8 8.2 700.0 92.9 7.1 258.3 70.5 29.5
Cotton 157.1 6.2 93.8 114.0 8.8 91.2 20.0 - 3.0 103.0
Rubber 36.4 140.0 -40.0 18.2 169.0 -69.0 15.4 -34.9 134.9
Sugarcane 78.2 123.0 -23.0 40.6 139.0 -39.0 26.7 134.1 -34.1
Note: PGR = Production Growth Rate
CAE = Contribution of Area Extention 
CYI = Contribution of field Increases 
Source: Calculated from data in
Agricultural Statistics 1964 to 1979 and Report to 
the Pyithu Hluttaw various issues.
When the period is taken as a whole, almost all of the increase 
in rice production was due to increased yields. The area planted to 
rice has increased only marginally. In fact, in the first sub-period, 
it declined. The area planted to other food crops increased
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significantly over the period and in all cases the contribution of 
increased area to the increase in production was more than the 
contribution of improved yields. Groundnuts show an interesting trend 
in that recently area has fallen but yields have improved.
Of the industrial crops, increases in area explains virtually all 
the increase in output for both jute and sugarcane. The reverse is 
true for cotton. Rubber, however, showed significant increases in 
area planted until 1971-2. This was accompanied by declining yields. 
Since then the trend has been reversed with the area planted falling 
but yields rising. Some of the causes of these trends are discussed 
later.
Summing up the points discussed above, it can be seen there was 
some diversification away from rice due to increases in the area sown 
to other crops, though yields also improved. This does not mean rice 
production was decreasing. It has also been increasing, but that is 
due largely to increases in yields.
5.4 Regional pattern of production
In the previous section, the changing pattern of agricultural 
production in Burma was illustrated. In this section, the regional 
pattern of production is described briefly. Moreover the districts 
have been grouped into three main zones, in order to make some 
comparison with pre-war conditions. This is to show that trends have 
not been consistent across the country. Thus, Administrative 
Divisions and States have been grouped into the administrative pattern 
of the colonial period, i.e. Lower Burma, Upper Burma and the
frontier States. These roughly coincide with physical
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conditions(Details of grouping will be found in Appendix Cl, C2 C3). 
Together Lower Burma and Upper Burma, as defined, are called 'Burma 
Proper', as they were in the pre-war period.
Lower Burma is by far the most important region for rice, almost 
all of which is grown under rainfed conditions. Much of the region is 
subject to deep flood, either in the delta of the Irrawaddy or Sittang 
rivers, or on the monsoon-wet coastal fringe. Rain is dependable and 
ranges from 2210 to 5588 millimetres annually. Such wet conditions in 
a strong seasonal pattern create severe constraints on diversification 
of production. Jute is suitable as an alternative field crop. Some 
other high value crops such as tobacco are grown on riverine land, or 
in the off season, and rubber and fruit are grown in hilly coastal 
districts.
Upper Burma is much drier, rainfall averaging 787 to 1016 
millimetres annually. Rain is not dependable and there are large 
variations from year to year. Mixed cropping is practised and rice 
grown mainly for subsistence. The region grows most of the country's 
oilseed crops and a large share of its pulses. From historic times 
irrigation has been important, especially for rice. Adverse climate 
is therefore the chief constraint.
In the frontier states the chief constraint is transport. The 
hill regions are very isolated and thinly populated. There are few 
main roads. Most farm production is for family use or local sale. 
Production for marketing in Burma Proper is low and there are huge 
areas of cultivable waste land.
5.4.1 Regional pattern of rice production
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The regional pattern of rice production is shown in Table 5.4. 
Details will be found in Appendix B. This table brings out the 
following points:
(1) In Burma Proper the gross sown paddy area was still lower in 1975- 
80 than in 1936-41. The 5 per cent drop was entirely due to the 
decline in Lower Burma, which was offset to a minor extent by a small 
increase in Upper Burma.
(2) Production in Burma Proper rose 28 per cent over the period 
studied. The increase was proportionately much larger(77%) in Upper 
Burma than in Lower Burma(20^).
(3) Yields similarly rose much more in Upper Burma(65^) than in Lower 
Burma(31^) over the period. The annual figures given in the Appendix 
C2 also show that yields in Upper Burma are becoming more stable from 
year to year than they used to be. At 1700 Kg/ha in 1975-80 period 
,Upper Burma yields are 65 per cent better than in 1936-41 and the 
discrepancy between them and Lower Burma yields has been reduced.
(4) Figures for the frontier states bring out the problem of extension 
of statistical coverage, which exaggerates output expansion slightly. 
Up to 1961-62 coverage was only in the Kachin State (the wet zone of 
northern Burma) and in one Chin hill district. After 1961—61 
production in the Shan and Kayah state was reported and and also the 
rest of the Chin hills. From Table 5.4, it can be calculated that 
production of the states (as defined) accounted for 7.4 per cent of 
Burma’s rice crop between 1975-80. In 1936-41, output in the limited
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hill areas covered by colonial statistics accounted for only 1.2 per 
cent of the recorded crop.
(5) Between 1961-62 and 1975-80 rice production in the frontier states 
rose by 23 per cent. This increase, averaging 1 per cent a year, is 
less than population growth. Grain shortages thus add to demand 
pressure from these regions for supplies from Burma Proper. Roughly 
12 per cent of Burma’s population live in the frontier states.
(6) Lower Burma is less dominant in rice production than it used to 
be. Taking Burma Proper only, in 1936-41 it produced 86 per cent of 
the harvest. By 1975-80 its share was 80 per cent.
Table 5.4
Regional Pattern of Rice Production
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1936-37 1950-51 1961-62 1968-69 1975-76 Change
to to to to to 1936-41
1940-41 1960-61 1967-68 1974-75 1979-80 to1975-80
AREA 000 ha. %
Lower Burma 4007 3115 3669 3663 3674 - 8.3
Upper Burma 946 772 79« 939 1017 + 7.5
Burma Proper «953 3887 4463 4602 4691 - 5.3
States 64 a 65 a 482 464 486 n.c
Total 5017 3952 4945 5066 5177 n.c
PRODUCTION 000 tonnes
Lower Burma 6069 5037 6052 6232 7303 + 20.3
Upper Burma 984 832 989 1269 1746 + 77.4
Burma Proper 7053 5869 7041 7501 9049 + 28.3
States 91 a 96 a 594 632 729 n.c
Total 7144 5965 7635 8133 9778 n.c
YIELD kg/ha. 
Lower Burma 1515 1617 1650 1702 1988 + 31.2
Upper Burma 1040 1078 1246 1351 1717 + 65.1
Burma Proper 1424 1510 1578 1630 1929 + 35.5
States 1422 a 1477 a 1232 1362 1300 + 5.5
Total 1424 1509 1544 1605 1889 + 32.7
Note: a Partial coverage
n.c. Not calculable 
Sources: As in Appendix C1, C2, C3.
5.4.2 Regional distribution of non-rice crops
Data on the distribution of the main non-rice crops by region are 
available only from 1963-64 to 1978-79 and are estimated in Table 5.5 
and Appendix D. Figures are not complete, however, as there is a 
residual between regional subtotals of those non-rice crops recorded 
separately and Union totals for all non-rice crops. In order to 
calculate any change in regional land use over time, and the share of
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non-rice in regional totals,the residual in each period has been 
distributed in the table on the assumption that its regional shares 
were the same as those for listed totals of non-rice crops.
Such an assumption makes the estimates in Table 5.5 subject to 
substantial margins of error. But it probably gives a better idea of 
the allocation than to leave it out altogether.
Table 5.5
Estimated Share of Non-rice Crops in Regional Land Use 
(*000 hectares)
Other crops 
listed
Residual
allocated
a
Total
other
crops
Rice Total %
other
crops
1963-64 
Lower Burma 611 133 7*19 3787 4536 16.5
Upper Burma 2188 494 2682 767 3449 77.8
States 188 43 231 499 730 31.6
Total 2987 675 3662 5053 8715 42.0
1969-70to 1971- 
Lower Burma
-72
659 170 829 3601 4430 18.7
Upper Burma 2392 619 3011 900 3911 77.0
States 168 43 211 459 670 31.5
Total 3219 832 4051 4960 9011 45.0
1976-77to 1978 
Lower Burma
-79
700 200 900 3668 4568 19.7
Upper Burma 2540 722 3262 1003 4265 76.5
States 215 60 275 485 760 36.2
Total 3455 932 4437 5156 9593 46.3
a Allocation of residual, see text.
Sources: see Appendix D
According to the estimates of table 5.5 land allocation over the 
15 years from 1963-64 to 1978-79 shifted in Lower Burma from rice to 
other crops. Only 20 per cent of the increases in other crop area was
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accounted for by new land.The remainder was land diverted from rice to 
other crops, two of which were jute and oilseeds(see Appendix D).
In Upper Burma on the contrary the rice area went up by 200,000 
hectares over the period and almost maintained its percentage share, 
in spite of an allocation of nearly 600,000 hectares to other crops. 
There were substantial shifts in the cropping pattern. Cotton and 
pulses declined, to be replaced by higher value crops such as onions, 
garlic, oilseeds and tobacco (Appendix D).
The pattern in the frontier states, however, showed remarkably 
little change in any of the main crop areas (see Appendix D) apart 
from some extra land alloted to sugarcane.
This discussion therefore clarifies the earlier conclusions. The 
diversification of production has come about by switching land from 
rice to other crops in Lower Burma, and by increasing the area planted 
to other crops at the same rate as new rice plantings in Upper Burma. 
There appears to have been little or no diversification in land use 
patterns in the frontier areas, largely because production is for 
local use, since transport difficulties constrain commercial outlets.
5.5 Causes of changing production
Government capital spending on the agricultural sector has been
limited since Independence (see Appendix E). Capital expenditure on
agriculture, including irrigation, averaged K39 million (US$ 8.2 m)
annually in 1952-3 to 1955-6, which was 7.7per cent of the total 
programme. By 1975-6 to 1979- 80 this had risen to an average of K235
million (US$ 3*1.9 m) a year, 9.2 per cent of total. If livestock and
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fisheries are included, the 1952-56 average remains the same, but the 
1975-80 average rises to K393 million(US$ 58m). Government priorities 
focussed on infrastructure and manufacturing investment throughout the 
period. During 1961/2-1979/80 manufacturing and processing received 
28 per cent of total state capital expenditure on the average. 
Although total exports and the balance of payments were unfavourable 
during 1963-72 period, because of the self reliance policy, the 
government had to import capital goods (including spare parts) for 
industry as first priority.
Despite this relative neglect, agricultural output still 
expanded. Some of the reasons for this are discussed in the next two 
sections. Initially factors affecting area planted are considered. 
Then those affecting yield are examined.
5.5.1 Factors affecting area
After independence government followed import substituting 
policies. Two main types of import replacement crops were promoted, 
i.e. cotton and jute for industrial raw materials and oil seeds such 
as groundnut and sesamum for edible oil production. Similarly 
sugarcane cultivation was promoted for the domestic sugar mills.
Government promoted industrial crops and oil seeds through giving 
subsidies to cover the cost of cultivation or by raising the 
government procurement prices. For example, for jute and cotton 
cultivation government distributed water pumps, insecticides and 
seeds. Also government determined by decree the area where cotton was 
to be sown so the farmers who used those areas were not allowed to
change the crops.
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During 1963-4 and onward because of increases of oil prices 
groundnut and sesamum cultivation were stimulated. And also cotton, 
jute and sugar cultivation were promoted by government through 
government subsidies.
Mostly new crops in Lower Burma were apparently more profitable 
than rice. But in the 1950s the rice area planted expanded as land 
which had not been cultivated since before the war was restored and 
production increased.
According to national data(a), during the 1954-62 to 1962-64 
period rice area rose slowly by 0.8 million hectares and other crops 
increased by 1 million hectares(see Table 5.2). In Upper Burma cotton 
planting increased sharply owing to the demand of government for long 
staple cotton and other kinds of cotton. This increase was due to 
growth in the domestic market demand for the production of local 
textile or spinning mills.
In chapter 4 it has been shown that real prices of all crops fell 
in the 1964- 72 period. Yet the areas planted to paddy, sesamum, 
jute, rubber and sugarcane increased. The area planted to groundnuts, 
pulses and cotton declined significantly. Cotton declined partly 
because farmers were reluctant to plant it owing to disease and high 
cost of production. Groundnuts competed with sesamum. The former 
crop was very labour intensive and yields depended on good weather 
while sesamum required much less labour and produced well even in bad 
weather. Groundnut also suffered because seed was difficult to obtain
(a) These estimates do not take into account the problem of 
extension of regional coverage discussed above.
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and also price of seed was very high.
"In reply to the demand for adequate (seed) 
groundnuts to be distributed in time, he(Col. Min 
Thein, Director-General of Agriculture) explained 
that there was some difficulty last year for 
various reasons. The whole country needed about 
4,300,000 baskets but some of the seeds reserved 
for Lower Burma Districts found their way to 
blackmarket owing to oil scarcity. Only about 
half the required quantity was therefore 
availalble" (Working People Daily;2March1965).
5.5.2 Factors affecting yields
Figures of the gross sown irrigated area again show the problem 
of statistical coverage. During the years 1962-4 areas previously 
unrecorded were included. These were mainly the gravity flow canal 
systems of the Shan states. From the figures of Table 5.6 and 
Appendices C1 to C3, it may be estimated that probably well over 
150,000 hectares of the extra irrigated area recorded between 1961-2 
and 1963-4 was due to these statistical inclusions.
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Table 5.6
Irrigation by Ownership 
(*000 hectares)
Government Private Total %
government
1961-2 318 218 536 59.3
1963-4 350 408 758 46.2
Change
iiii
C0 
1
m
 
ii i
+ 
ii i i i i■ i
+ 190 + 222
Source:Statistical Year Book , 1967,p-146.
The figures also show that in 1963-4 slightly less than half of 
the gross irrigated area was provided by government schemes. This 
does not take quality into account, which was much higher for state 
schemes than for private. The state systems are not only of superior 
quality, but also include all the dams capable of storage for dry 
season use.
In the aggregate, irrigation is important mainly for rice in 
Upper Burma and the frontier states. Complete figures are available 
only for 1970-71, and the position may have changed since then. From 
Table5.7, it will be seen that 90 per cent of irrigation in Upper 
Burma was then devoted to rice, and in the frontier states 75 per
cent.
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Table 5.7
Irrigation by Region and Crop, 1970-71 
(gross sown, ’000 hectares)
Rice
Irrigated
Other Total Rice
Total
Other Total
Lower Burma 62 38 100 3617 837 4454
a (1.7) (4.5) (2.3)
Upper Burma 465 153 618 903 2934 3837
a (51.5) (5.2) (16.1)
States 208 18 226 459 290 749
a (45.3) (6.2) (30.2)
Total
a
735
(14.8)
209
(5.1)
944
(10.4)
4979 4061 9040
(a) Irrigated area divided by total for each crop 
group in percentage.
Sources: Richter, 1973«PP147-150,Statistical Year Book, 
Agricultural Statistics, various issues.
According to these estimates less than 15 per cent of the total 
rice area was irrigated in 1970-71 because of the very low share 
irrigated in Lower Burma. But in Upper Burma 52 per cent of the rice 
area was irrigated and in the frontier States 45 per cent. Irrigation
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of non-rice crops was about 5 per cent in all three zones.
Appendices C1 to C3 give the rice area irrigated in each of the 
three main geographic zones to 1976. Table 5.9 summarizes the 
position. It will be seen that there has been a decided increase in 
the area irrigated, especially over the past decade. Taking the whole 
period from 1952 to 1976, the irrigated rice area in Burma Proper 
expanded over 1*10,000 hectares, or by 29 per cent.
Table 5.8
Irrigated Rice Area, 3 Zones 
(*000 hectares)
1952-3 1958-9 1963-4 1968-9 1973-4 % increase
to to to to to 1952/3-1975/6
1957-8 1962-3 1967-8 1872-3 1975-6
Lower Burma 40.0 36.5 56.6 63.2 96.5 141
Upper Burma 451.5 434.5 436.9 468.2 537.3 19
Sub-total 491.5 471.0 493.5 531.4 633.8 29
States 3.7a 9.2a 172.6 204.0 216.7 n.c.
Total 495.2a 480.2a 668.1 735.4 850.5 n.c.
(a) partial coverage
n.c. not calculable
Source: See Appendices C1 to C3.
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In Upper Burma 58 per cent of the region's ricefields were 
irrigated in 1952-58. By 1973-6, in spite of an increase of about
250.000 hectares in its total rice area, the irrigated share was still 
53 per cent, since the irrigated area had been expanded there by
86.000 hectares over the period. This expansion, together with 
improvements in existing schemes which gave better water control, 
allowed the adoption of the exotic high yield rice varities.
5.6 Yield-raising measures
Government research and extension services' main activity has 
always been improving rice, but other crops are also dealt with. 
Foodcrops such as groundnuts and industrial crops such as cotton are 
researched and seed and technical advice extended. 6300 farm
extension workers were employed by the l ;ate in 1980-81(Report to the 
Pyithu Hluttaw; 1981-82,p64). The Burma Socialist Programme Party 
has also been involved in organizing farmers to promote better 
technologies and in distributing inputs.
5.6.1 High yield rice varieties
A big effort in research and in organization has been put into 
the high yield varieties(HYV) programme since modern rice varieties 
were introduced from the International Rice Research Institute in 
1966. Seeds were initially based at government seed farms and later 
also by approved private foundation seed farms. Lately stocks of some 
varieties have been enough for farmers to breed themselves. In 
1980-81 the government distributed roughly 35,000 tons of paddy 
seed(ibid,p5^), sufficient to plant 650,000 hectares. Seed for the
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remaining three quarters of the HYV area was grown by farmers 
themselves.
Area, production and yield of HYV rices for 1968-69 to 1980—81 
are given in Table 5.9. Diffusion of exotic strains was at first 
slow. This was mainly because their short stature made them 
unsuitable for Lower Burma’s flood conditions. Also because their 
eating quality was poor. Eating quality has been improved in the 
newer strains, but stature remains a big constraint. As is well known 
the short statured HYV rices need controlled water as well as 
fertilizer and insecticides. They are therefore grown either in Upper 
Burma irrigated tracts or in shallower areas of Lower Burma, such as 
the midzone in the north of the region.
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Table 5.9
High Yield Rice Varieties and Other Varieties 
as Share of Output
Area
HYV
*000 ha
Production
HYV
’000 tons
Yield
HYV
Kg/ha
Yield (a) 
all other 
rice areas
1968-69 167 510 3058 1549
(3.3) (6.4)
1974-75 697 1650 2372 1551
(13.5) (19.2)
1979-80 1726 4660 2700 1753
(29.1) (22.4)
1980-81 2334 7283 3120 2168
(45.6) (54.7)
(a) This column is derived by deducting high yield variety
area and production data from total crop returns. 
Figures in brackets are the percentage of H.Y.V. to 
total rice area and production each season.
Sources: Calculated from:
Report to the People 1970-71 and Report to the Pyithu 
Hluttaw 1981-82, pp72-3.
The area under HYV had been raised to 2.3 million hectares by 
1980-81, 45 per cent of the total rice area(Table 5.9). This big 
spread is largly due to official promotion. A strategy was designed
Page 61
for diffusion under a Whole Township Rice Production Programme from 
1975-76 onwards. In its essence this is a selective-concentration 
strategy(Khin Win and Nyi Nyi; 1980)
There are five components of the new selective-concentrative 
strategy. These are:
(1) A correct and proven new technology
(2) Political will and political guidance
(3) Selectivity and concentration
(4) Mass participation
(5) Emulation and competition(ibid)
In 1977-78 the first whole township programme was launched by the 
Agricultural Corporation in two townships, Shwebo in Upper Burma and 
Taikkyi in Lower Burma. These covered 38,000 and 53,000 hectares 
respectively. Extension workers under the programme distributed seed, 
fertilizer and insecticides and also promoted more efficient 
techniques, such as line planting, and recommended plant densities, 
transplanting and weeded times for the exotic and local HYVs. By 
1979-80 the programme was extended to 43 townships(ibid).
Yields obtained were more than double established district yields 
when the programme was on a small scale. But as diffusion spread to 
large areas they were diluted. Table 5.9 shows that the margin 
between HYV yield and the average of all other rice grown in Burma 
gradually declined to 44 per cent in 1979-81. Yields were also good 
for non-HYV rice in 1979-81(Table 5.9). It was not known what share
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of the improvement was due to diffusion of knowledge from the 
government programme or what share was due to better weather.
5.6.2 Fertilizers
Fertilizer use on paddy was very low until 1960, about 3000 tons 
a year. Then it gradually rose to 17,000 tons by 1964-65(Statistical 
Year Book 1965 and 1969, table 83 and 73). When the HYV programme was 
launched on a large scale, government expected a huge increase in 
farmers’ use and in 1967-68 imported 230,000 tons at a cost of K86.5 
million, which was 11 per cent of the value of all 
imports(Richter;1976,p 19). But farmers did not respond as much as 
expected and only 57,000 tons was used for rice and 70,000 for all 
crops. Since then fertilizer use for paddy has been gradually raised 
from 94,000 tons in 1976-77 to 183,000 tons in 1980-81. This was 83 
per cent of total fertilizer use in both seasons(Report to the Pyithu 
Hluttaw;1981—82,p56).
5.7 Non-rice crops and higher yields
Programmes have also been launched to raise yields of 19 non-rice 
crops, but these are too recent to have had much impact so far. The 
main research and extension effort for non-rice crops up to recent 
times has been groundnuts and cotton. But there have been problems in 
both crops. The long staple cotton needed by the state textile mills 
was not the same as the short staple usually grown.Yields per hectare 
were very low; less than 200 Kg/ha in 1961-62. Although they were 
raised to 388 Kg/ha in 1980-81 by better seed and improved techniques,
this was still very low by international standards.
Page 63
The same situation applied to groundnuts, whose yields were 
raised from 696 Kg/ha in 1961-62 to 899 Kg/ha in 1980-81(calculated 
from Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw 1981-82,pp69-70). An additional 
problem for groundnuts was the provision of seed, since groundnuts 
have an unusually high 10 per cent seed usage rate, and the seeds do 
not store well. Government distributed 1500 tons of seed in 1980-81, 
so that farmers had to produce the bulk of their requirements 
themselves. Groundnuts are not heavy users of fertilizer. In 
1980-81 18.6Kg/ha of fertilizer was used on groundnuts and 24 Kg/ha on 
cotton (Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw 1981-82, p56).
Summarising the facts discussed above, one can say that 
governments have not directly caused diversification of the cropping 
pattern since independence, in spite of efforts in the 1960s to 
promote import replacement crops. Government has been successful in 
promoting higher yields and production of rice since the late 1960s, 
especially in Upper Burma. But its record for other crops has not 
been encouraging. On the whole it can be thought that government 
programmes have tended to concentration of production pattern rather 
than diversification, partly through their technical programmes and 
partly through their price policies. Diversification seems to have 
been largely the rusult of the farmers own initiative, stimulated 
partly by free market prices and partly by their own subsistence 
needs.
Farmers* marketable surpluses after their subsistence needs were 
met constituted the supply for both home non-farm consumption and 
export. They therefore affected the volume and composition of 
exports,to be considered in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
THE EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF INDEPENDENT BURMA 
6.1 Introduction
Burma is a small country which cannot produce heavy industrial 
goods because of its small market and lack of technical skills. It is 
heavily dependent on agriculture and forestry for foreign exchange 
earnings and for funds to finance reconstruction and development.
The aim of the first two governments, the Parliamentary and the 
Revolutionary Council Governments, were to diversify the agricultural 
production in support of import substituting industries. The export 
trade was almost all nationalised after independence, when state 
boards were set up to handle exports of agricultural and forestry 
products. The State Agricultural Marketing Board(SAMB) was created in 
1946 and given a monopoly of rice exports as well as the right to 
export other agricultural products. Profits of the SAMB were expected 
to be the government's main source of funds to finance reconstruction 
and modernization of the economy. The present government is more 
outward looking. It also wished to diversify agricultural production, 
but at the same time wants to diversify exports.
.2 Balance of trade, balance of payments and foreign exchange
Rice has been the main product handled by the SAMB. According to 
the so called K.T.A. (a) eight year plan of the early 1950s (to run
a K.T.A. = Knappen Tippetts Abbett Engineering Co., U.S. 
consultants employed by the government.
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from 1952-3 to 1959-60), rice exports over the period were to provide 
the bulk of state profits and foreign exchange costs of investment.
In the early 1950s world rice prices were very high because of 
the Korean war boom. In mid-1953 the common rice export grade (42 per 
cent brokens) fetched>^60 a long ton. The KTA estimates of foreign 
exchange earnings were based on a forecast price of % 55 a ton over the 
eight year period. But the rice price soon began to fall and dropped 
to only £ 34 a ton by 1955/56(Walinsky;1962,p372).
Because of rice exports there were large surpluses in both the 
balance of trade and payments in the 1950-53 period(Table 6.1 and 
Appendix F). But after then, although the volume of rice exports rose 
to 1962, the value rose only a little. At the same time imports for 
the development plan and consumers1 goods for the people increased 
sharply. So there was only a small surplus on trade, a deficit on 
overall payments and a decline in foreign exchange reserves in the 
1954-62 period. The government began to be more inward looking.
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Table 6.1
Balance of Trade, Balance of Payments and Foreign Exchange 
Reserves
(in million kyats)
year ! Balance of Trade SBalance of j Foreign
1 ! Payments 1 Exchange
1 1 Reserves
Export Import +/- Recei- Pay- +/- Total FE/
pts ments (Import)
1950-55 967.85 694.33 +273.52 1347 1099 +248.0 969.3 140
1954-62 1105.00 1059.53 + 45.47 1207 1273 - 66.0 684.2 65
1963-72 795.20 932.95 -137.75 1218 1280 - 62.0 779.7 84
1973-80 1609.65 1680.16 - 70.51 3817 3638 +179.0 925.6 55
Note:(1)1950 -51 to 1952-53 average, 1953-54 to 1962
average,1963 to 1972-73 average and 1974-75 to 
1979-80 average. (2)1952-53 year only. (3)1951 
to 1953 average.
Source:Walinsky(1962)«Statistical Year Book 1969,Report 
to the People 1971-72 and Report to the Pyuthu 
Hluttaw 1975-76,1977-78,1979- 80 and 1982-83.
In March 1962, the Revolutionary Council Government came into 
power and economic policies were changed. But the major effects only 
started in 1964 in which year all the trade, internal and external, 
were nationalised and export sector was entirely monopolised by the 
government. The economic policy became very inward looking during 
that period.
Only essential goods and raw materials were given high priority 
and imported in large quantities. Imports of comsumers’ goods fell 
significantly(Table 6.2). The imports of capital goods were 
242million kyats in 1953-64. That accounted for 26 per cent of total
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imports, rising to K483 million, or 68per cent of all total imports, 
in 1967-68.
Table 6.2
Imports by Type of Commodity (in million kyats)
1953-54 1967-68 1975-76 1979-80
% % % %
Consumer goods 362 38.2 69 9.7 190 13.2 204 4.9
Inter-industry 3*13 36.2 162 22.7 745 51.7 1323 31.5
uses
Capital goods 242 25.6 483 67.6 505 35.1 2673 63.6
Total Imports 947 100.0 714 100.0 1440 100.0 4200 100.0
Sources: Calculated from Economic Survey of Burma 1957,
Table 29,p39; Report to the People 1969-70, and 
Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw 1979-80 and 1982-83.
However, the exports in that period fell in both value and volume 
terms, initially mainly because of the decline in rice prices, later 
also because rice shipments fell sharply. Therefore the country had 
to suffer a serious balance of payments problem during that period(see 
Table 6.1).
The present government, Pyithu Hluttaw government, is more 
outward looking and it promotes exports under new policy guidelines. 
In the Burma Socialist Programme Party’s Short-term and Long-term 
Economic Policy Guidelines, the government stated the policy and aims
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for foreign trade(BSPP;1974,pp101-262).
(i) to improve export and foreign exchange earnings so as to 
achieve a favourable balance in its payments.
(ii) to diversify the export pattern, depending on the world 
market situation.
However, foreign trade is still entirely controlled by the government 
and priority is still given to capital goods imports. During the 
1973-80 period, exports in current prices increased by 102 per cent 
compared to the previous period, 1963-72, but also imports increased 
by 80 per cent. Therefore the balance of trade was still negative, 
although the balance of payments was positive during that period, 
owing to loans and grants.
6.3 Pattern and commodity concentration in exports
Rice has always been the principal export item, except in 1973 
when the highest export earnings were obtained from timber. In 
pre-war time, from 1937-40, rice contributed 45 per cent of total 
exports; mining, oil and other western enterprises brought in 47 per 
cent, i.e.rubber and timber 8.3 per cent, metalliferous ores 13.5per 
cent and mineral fuels 25.5 per cent.
Up to 1963, Burma was the world’s largest rice exporter. Between 
1950 and 1963 annual exports of rice and rice products averaged over 
1.5 million tons(compared to 3.2 million tons in 1936-41). From 1964 
onwards Thailand surpassed Burma as the leading exporter, but Burmese 
exports were over 1 million tons a year until 1966. The 1966-7 season 
was very bad in Lower Burma and crop output was low,so that there was 
a domestic rice crisis and home supplies were short. From this date 
onwards Burma has exported from a low of 150,000 tons in 1973(1.6 per
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cent of world trade) to a high of 831,000 tons in 1971(8.9 per cent of 
the world trade). Details will be found in Appendix H.
After the second World War, because of damage to the mining, 
petroleum production and forestry sectors, the country’s exports were 
concentrated more strongly on rice. So in the 1950-61 period rice 
contributed 73 per cent of total exports and other agricultural 
products accounted for 15 per cent.
Non-agricultural products comprised 12 per cent of total exports 
in that period. Failure of rice markets and foreign exchange 
constraints led to efforts to diversify exports into other 
commodities. Detailed figures of the kyats value of exports and their 
composition can be found in Appendix H. Table 6.3 gives a summary in 
terms of percentage.
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Table 6.3
Composition of Exports by Main Groups 
(percentage of total value)
1937-40 1950-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80
Rice 44.8 76.9 70.5 63.7 44.2 32.6 45.6
Other agri-
products(a) 5.5 13.3 15.9 16.7 15.0 18.5 8.0
Total agri-
products (50.4) (90.2) (86.4) (80.3) (59.2) (51.1) (53.6)
Timber 7.1 3.4 6.3 12.1 21.7 23.7 27.2
Others 42.6 6.4 7.3 7.5 19.1 25.1 19.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(a) Includes animal and fishery products.
Sources: Calculated from The Economic Development of
Burma, Economics Department, University of 
Rangoon, 1959. Year Book of International Trade 
Statistics (YBITS) various issues., Report to the 
Pyithu Hluttaw 1979-80 and 1982-83.
The apparent diversification of the trade pattern from 1966 to 
1975 was however caused to only a limited extent by growth in the 
value of non-agricultural products.Since independence timber exports 
have become more and more important. In the 1950-55 period they 
contributed 3.4 per cent of total exports and in 1976-80 27.2 per 
cent. Apart from this the main reason for the change was a heavy fall 
in the volume and value of rice shipments, due to a lag in production
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and failure of government procurement. Other agricultural product 
exports did not increase much in value in this period either. But in 
1976-80 period the contribution of rice exports rose to 45.6 per cent, 
recovering their share of the end of the 1960s. The share of other 
agricultural products decreased by 10.5 per cent in 1976-80 compared 
to 1971-75.
Figures are given in Table 6.4 (and in Appendix G for rice) in 
U.S. dollar terms. They show that rice exports were one third of 
their 1950-65 dollar value in 1966-75. Other agricultural exports 
also declined between these periods.
Even after trade recovered in 1976-80, average annual exports of 
rice in terms of U.S. dollars were 38 per cent lower than in 1950-55. 
This does not take inflation into account. The drop was much larger 
in real terms. The dollar value of other agricultural exports was 
even lower in 1976-80 than in the 1950s.
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Table 6.4
Value of Exports, Broad Categories 
(in million US dollars)
1937-40 1950-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80
Rice
Other agri-
81.8 164.8 158.5 155.4 59.4 52.8 127.8
products a 10.1 28.5 35.8 40.6 20.1 30.0 22.3
Subtotal (91.9) (193.2) (194.3) (196.0) (79.5) (82.8) (150.1)
Timber 12.9 7.2 14.1 29.5 29.1 38.5 76.3
Others 77.7 13.7 16.3 18.4 25.7 40.7 53.7
Total 182.5 214.2 224.7 243.9 134.3 162.0 280.2
a Includes animal and marine products.
Exchange rates:1937-40 Rp 2.84 = US$ 1.0 (Rp 13.33= 3E1 -0, US$ 
4.7= "2 1.0, 13.33/4.7=2.84); 1950-73 K4.76=US$ 1.0;1971-5
average K5.44=US$1.0; 1976-80 K6.74=US$1,0(IMF quoted market
rates).
Sources: Calculated from 1950-80,IMF, International
Financial Statistics, monthly. Economic
Development of Burma, Economics Dept.; University 
of Rangoon.,1959. Year Book of International 
Trade Statistics various issues. Report to the 
Pyithu Hluttaw 1979-80 and 1982-83.
These figures suggest that Burma's export trade is very concentrated 
by commodity. Michaely’s study(1962) of non-oil countries found that 
Burma had the seventh most concentrated export trade pattern in the 44 
countries he studied for 1954. Michaely based his study on the UN 
Standard International Trade Classification(SITC) drawn to the 3 digit 
level, which has 150 commodity groups. He then appliec. ,ne following
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formula for exports.
The coefficient of commodity concentration of 
exports of country j, to be denoted by C jx , is 
defined as
where X ij stands for the value of country j’s 
exports of commodity i to the rest of the world in 
the reference period(here, the year 1954),while 
X .j represents the total value of country j’s 
exports to the rest of the world in the same 
period. For convenience, the coefficient is 
expressed in percentage form..............
It may be readily seen that this coefficient 
will be lower the larger is the number of goods
exported by the country......  ,and the more
evenly are exports distributed among these goods.
Obviously, the highest possible coefficient is 
100, where all exports consist of a single good.If 
n is the largest number of commodities which may 
potentially be exported, the lowest possible 
coefficient is
100 
V  n
this represents the case in which the country's 
exports are equally divided among all commodities.
In our case-where n=150- the lowest possible 
coefficient would thus be about
8.2,...(Michaely;1962,pp7-8).
By analysing Burma's exports as given in the same SITC classifications
in the UN trade statistics for later years, I have calculated 
concentration ratios for Burma using Michaely's formula.Results are 
given in Table 6.5.
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Table 6.5
Concentration in Burma's Exports,1950-1980 (a)
1950-55 77.4 1966-70 51.7
1956-60 71.3 1971-75 44.1
1961-65 65.6 1976-80 55.4
(a) Concentration according to Michaely formula, see 
text.
Source: Calculated from UN Year Book of International
Trade Statistics, various issues.
It will be seen from this table that Burma's trade is less 
concentrated than in the early 1950s , although concentration is still 
high. It fell to an average of 44.1 in the 1971-75 period. But as 
has been explained, this was mainly because of a failure in the supply 
of the main commodity, rice. It rose to 55.4 in 1976-80, as the rice 
trade recovered and timber exports rose substantially. The export 
pattern according to Burma’s own trade returns grouped into 10 
commodities will be found in Appendix H.
6.4 Export constraints: rice and other farm products
There has been some diversification of exports in Burma because 
of the changes in rice exportable surpluses and the world market 
situation. After second World War, the Burmese economy had to rely 
mainly on rice export for foreign exchange earnings.
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The marketable surplus of rice and other crops was reduced both 
by the big increase in Burma’s population since World War II and by 
higher per capita consumption.
"Because the farm population has increased 
more than food output over the past thirty years, 
the marketable surplus of agricultural sector has 
declined.....
The reduction in the marketable surplus of 
the farm sector affects particularly foreign 
trade. In poor agricultural seasons,such as those 
of 1966-8, export earnings from farm products have 
been adequate only to keep the economy going at 
minimum levels and have contributed little or 
nothing to growth (Richter;1969,p159)
Because of two main factors, the exports of rice of Burma are 
decreasing over time. They are external and internal factors(BSPP’s 
Economics Paper No:5;1969,p83, in Burmese.)
The external factors are:
(1) The world rice production has increased after 1966.
(2) The United States of America, which exported 1.2 million tons of 
rice annually in 1962-64,became the world’s largest rice exporter 
since 1966.
(3) Rice importing countries such as Japan and Philippines have become 
rice exporting countries.
Related to this last point,there are big changes in demand from 
each importing country according to its harvests, since in most 
cases imports are only marginal to total demand.
In the colonial period ,India was Burma’s chief market for 
rice. In 1936-41 it took on average 52 per cent of the total 
volume, excluding rice bran( Agricultural Statistics 1973-74 and
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1975-76). After independence the combined total of shipments to 
India ,Pakistan and Bangladesh took an average of a quarter to a 
third of total shipments, reaching 537,000 tons on the average 
between 1954 and 1960(Walinsky;1962,pl69). Thereafter the share was 
much lower, dropping to nil in 1974 and 1975 (Table 6.6). This was 
the main reason for the decline in the share of Burma's rice exports 
going to Asian markets from an average of 75 per cent in 1954-1970 
to an average of 66 per cent in 1971-73»
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Table 6.6
Rice Exports by Destination 
(percentage of total volume)
Indian
sub-continent
Other
Asian
Asian
markets
West
Europe
Other Total
1954/5-
1956/7 27.0 40.3 67.3 5.6 27.1 100
1957/8-
1959/60 31.1 45.9 77.0 5.7 17.3 100
1960-63 25.7 53.1 78.8 5.0 16.2 100
1964-66 24.6 53.9 78.5 3.8 17.7 100
1967-69 29.5 46.3 75.8 1.9 22.3 100
1970-72 12.9 55.6 68.5 4.2 27.3 100
1973 8.9 56.7 65.6 15.9 18.5 100
1974 - 83.6 83.6 0.9 15.5 100
1975 - 42.1 42.1 39.5 18.4 100
1976 1.2 42.0 43.2 31.3 25.5 100
Sources:1954-60, WalinskyC1962),pl69;1960-1976 from Khin 
San May;1981,p139-140.
Other markets are very erratic.The most striking example is 
China, which bought nearly 100,000 tons in each of three years 1964 to 
1966, 102,000tons in 1974 (48 per cent of total exports) and almost 
nothing in the years between . Indonesia and Ceylon are also erratic 
and sometimes large buyers.
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On the other hand there were internal factors that made exports 
of rice lower. The major one was that the level of government 
procurement fell significantly. This was related to these factors.
(a) real price of rice has fallen over time except 1973 —74 when 
the government raised the procurement prices of rice to 
twice the previous year's price.
(b) the government's 1964 policy of making rice prices standard 
in all regions in the country promoted total consumption of 
rice, since before that date, in States and remote areas, 
rice was rarely purchased from outside the region.
(c) partly because of unfavourable weather experienced in 1966, 
the farmers wanted to retain higher level of rice and the 
government procurement became very low.
There are also factors that affects the price of rice exports in 
the world market. Prices are volatile in world rice markets and 
became more volatile in the 1970s(Table 6.7). The income and price 
elasticity of basic foods like rice is generally fairly low, and there 
are big changes in international rice prices from season to season. 
This is because the proportion of world production(consumption) which 
enters foreign trade is very low. Only a narrow margin of 4-5 per 
cent of world rice output enters international markets, so that a 
small change in world output has a big affect on foreign trade.
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Table 6.7
Price Range for Burma’s Rice Exports 
(unit value US $ per ton)
1950-60 1961-70 1971-78
High 173 144 375
Low 83 81 73
L as % of H 48 56 19
Source: Appendix G.
Although paddy production improved after 1968, the country was 
confronted with the difficulties of selling rice. Some of the 
traditional buyers reduced their purchases and Burma lost some of its 
traditional purchasers.
The position for rice is given in Table 6.8. This bring out the 
following main features, when comparing 1936-41 with 1976-79. 1)There 
has been a 26 per cent increase in recorded paddy output during the 
period. 2)The milling conversion ratio of paddy to rice is thought to 
have declined from 65 per cent before World War II to 61 per cent over 
recent years(Richter;1976,p27) based on official returns. 3)Domestic 
retention (residual of production less exports) for all purposes, 
including stockfeed, waste and seed use, increased from an estimated 
101 Kg a head in 1937-41 to around 165 Kg from 1967 onwards. 4) 
Exports averaged only 7-12 per cent of estimated milled output in 
1967-79, compared to 66 per cent in 1937-41.
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Table 6.8
Rice Area, Production, 
1936/7 to
Yield,
1976/9
Exports and Domestic Retention
! 1936-7 1950-1 1954-5 1958-9 1961-2 1967 1971 1976
! to to to to to to to to
!1940-1 1953-4 1957-8 1960-1 1966-7 1970 1975 1979
Sown area(’OOOha) ! 5193 3980 4145 4287 4946 4737 4835 5097
Paddy production ! 7545 5584 5845 6802 7592 8072 8384 9556
(’000 rat) !
Yield per hectare(kg) 1453 1403 1410 1587 1534 1703 1742 1873
Rice Production a ! 4902 3630 3799 4421 4935 4924 5114 5829
(milled ’000t) !
Exports, milled rice! 3249 1271 1785 1773 1343 613 368 530
(’000 t) !
Export(^) of total ! 66 35 47 40 27 12 7 9
volume !
Retention for domest- 1653 2359 2014 2648 3592 4311 4746 5299
ic use ( '000 t) !
Retention per head ! 101 120 96 118 146 165 164 168
of population per ! 
year (kg) !
—  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  _  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  “  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  ”  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —
Note: a Milling conversion rate of paddy to rice 65*
1 9 3 6 -1961, thereafter 61 per cent.
Sources: H.V.Richter(1969,1976), A.Palacpac(1982) and
Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw 1982-83.
Page 81
All parts of these estimates (except the export figures) are of 
course rather doubtful. But it is interesting to note that if the 
milling conversion rate between paddy and rice were raised to 65 per 
cent and the retention rate of rice per head reduced to 145 Kg (the 
rate normal in Thailand), there would have been a rice export surplus 
of 1.6 million tons in 1976-79, instead of 0.53 million.
The government is responsible for supplying the home market with 
rice. This has priority over export sales. But according to a study 
by Khin San May, Burmese rice exports might be larger in volume and 
value if (1) the government had better estimates of likely harvests 
and of the stock position, so that it did not keep excessive stocks as 
insurance and (2)the state export board was more flexible in the 
export sales policies (Khin San May ;1979,pp90—93,118.)
Because of the factors discussed above, average annual rice 
exports fell in both tonnage and percentage terms until 1976(Table 
6.9). The exception is a slight rise in 1970-72. After the 1976-8 
period, rice exports have again been increasing.
From 1950 to 1963, Burma supplied over a quarter of world rice 
exports. However, it declined after that. By 1970-80, Burma supplied 
only 5per cent of world exports(Table 6.9 and Appendix G).
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Table 6.9
Burma’s Exports of Rice and World Market Share
»
Volume 
000 tons
%
of world Average 
K
price per ton 
US$
equivalent
1950-60 1477 26.1 563 118
1961-63 1664 24.5 467 98
1964-66 1302 16.4 505 106
1967-69 479 6.0 622 131
1970-72 686 7.3 389 82
1973-75 216 2.6 1331* 253
1976-78 560 5.9 1310 193
1979-80 627 5.1 1720 259
Sources: as Appendix G.
Export concentration appears to have declined in Burma since 
independence. However it was argued in this section that this was due 
more to a decline in rice production than to increase in the 
production of other exports. Timber is a notable exception.
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6.5 Direction of total exports
Since independence, Burma has faced instabilities of rice 
exports. This instability of exportable surpluses and quality of 
produce affected the gaining of consistent buyers. These changed the 
direction of trade.
Before the second World War, India was the largest trade partner 
of Burma because of close geographical and political ties. In 
1934-38, Burma exported 55 per cent of its total exports to India. 
This was equivalent to 16 per cent of the total imports of India.(At 
that time India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were one country).But from 
1949-60 Burma exported to India and Pakistan only about 25 per cent of 
its total exports. The main product sold was rice. India and 
Pakistan remained the largest combined market for Burma until 1966-70. 
Then Burmese exports to India and Pakistan dropped to 7 per cent of 
total exports(Table 6.10).
By 1971-75 Japan had taken the leading position in Burma’s export 
market. A close economic relationship between the countries was 
established, mainly because of Japan’s leading role as a supplier of 
imports. Table 6.10 suggests that there has been some diversification 
in markets for Burmese goods. However, this is probably due to the 
problems of finding markets for rice rather than to deliberate 
attempts by the government to diversify trade patterns.
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Table 6.10
Direction of Trade 
Percentage Export by Country 
(in million kyats)
1934-38 1949-55 1956-60 1961 -65 1966-70 1971-75
% value % value % value % value % value %
India 54.8 261 25.4 190 17.9 102 8.8 114 18.0 20 2.7
Pakistan - 11 - 75 7.1 79 6.8 16 2.6 35 4.4
Sri Lanka 11.8 162 15.8 109 10.3 125 10.8 60 9.4 41 5.4
Malaya and 
Singapore 7.5 92 8.9 96 9.1 87 7.5 57 9.0 86 10.9
Indonesia 2.6 107 10.4 146 13.8 129 11.2 35 5.6 49 6.3
U.K. 1.9 69 6.8 87 8.2 105 9.1 43 6.8 69 8.3
China 2.1 23 2.2 34 8.4 100 8.6 23 3.6 69 8.8
Japan - 114 11.1 82 7.7 73 6.3 48 7.5 112 14.3
Others 19.3 189 19.4 240 17.5 358 30.9 238 37.5 303 38.9
Total 100.0 1027 100.0 1061 100.0 1158 100.0 634 100.0 782 100.0
Source: UN Year Book of International Trade Statistics, 
various issues.
6.6 Export/G.D.P. ratios
It was stated earlier that economic planners at independence had 
two main policy aims. First, to reduce the ratio of exports to 
national income, so as to lessen the vulnerability of the economy to
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external shock. Second, to reduce the proportionate contribution of 
rice exports both to total foreign trade value and to Gross Domestic 
Product (G.D.P.).
Table 6.11 shows that these two aims have been achieved. the 
contribution of foreign trade to G.D.P. has diminished as the 
domestic economy has diversified, and the share of rice in G.D.P. and 
total exports has dropped sharply. As far as the first aim is 
concerned, the result may be attributable to government policy on 
diversification of the general structure of the economy away from the 
export-oriented colonial mode. For the second, it is not clear 
whether the changing pattern was because of, or in spite of, 
government policies.
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TABLE 6.11
Contribution of Rice to Total Exports and Gross Domestic 
Product (a) (million kyats and per cent)
1949-50to
1961-62
1962-63to
1972-73
1973-74to
1930-81
Average G.D.P at current
prices a 5903 9266 27655
Rice export b 762 431 658
Total exports 1046 838 1610
Export/GDP 17.7 9.0 5.8
Rice export/GDP 12.9 4.7 2.4
Rice export/Total exports 73 51 41
a Value of net output and services at current producers’ 
prices.
b 1950—61, 1962-72 and 1973-80 average.
Sources:Calculated from data in National Income of Burma 
1964;UN Year Book of International Trade
Statistics various issues; Report to the People 
1971-72; Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw 1979-80 and 
1982-83.
Whereas exports were equivalent to 33 per cent of national 
product in the mid-1930's, they declined in relative importance 
throughout the whole period since independence. Exports were less 
than 6 per cent of G.D.P. in the 1973-81 period. The contribution of
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rice has declined even more sharply as the pattern of foreign trade 
has diversified. Thus in 1973-81 rice exports were equivalent to only 
2.4 per cent of estimated national product, compared to nearly 18 per 
cent in the 1950s.
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Chapter 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It was shown earlier that the three governments of independent 
Burma have reacted differently to the problems facing the country. 
All, however, have attempted to promote and diversify the agricultural 
sector,and to reduce the export orientation of the economy. The most 
recent government is also interested in export diversification.
This study examined the trends in both agricultural production 
and exports since independence and the ways the government has tried 
to influence both. Although Burma is a socialist country , its 
agricultural sector is largely privately controlled. Governments 
therefore had to find ways of inducing farmers to change production 
trends. Price policy is one of the most important methods. Price 
trends were discussed in some detail to set the scene for the 
discussion of agricultural production.
The most important conclusion was that there does not seem to 
have been consistent attempts to influence relative prices. Mostly, 
the real price of agricultural commodities seemed to move in the same 
direction. The obvious case was the general price increase of 
1973—7-4. It should be noted, however, that details of costs were not 
available. Price trends, therefore, can only indicate general trends 
in the level of profitability. For this reason, it is unlikely that 
agricultural supply will move in the same direction as prices all the
time.
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Within the technical constraints of soils and climate, production 
seems to have diversified away from rice. Other crops have assumed 
more importance, particularly the import competing crops of 
groundnuts, sesamum and sugarcane. It is very difficult to explain 
this trend in terms of output price policy. The government, 
especially from 1962-64, did encourage these crops, but mainly in the 
form of input subsidies and extension efforts. In fact, much of the 
government's activity has been devoted, especially in recent years, to 
increasing rice production. It is almost as if diversification 
occurred despite the government.
Two apparent successes of price policy can, however, be found. 
Firstly, the general increase in prices of 1973-74 did lead to a 
substantial increase in acreages planted to all crops. This increased 
production. Secondly, the relative increase in the price of pulses 
over recent years has led to significant increases in the output of 
this crop.
Two general aims of trade policy also seem to have been achieved; 
to reduce the importance of exports in national income and to lessen 
the share of rice in the national economy and exports. The trend with 
export composition was seen to be similar to that of agricultural 
production. Exports have diversified to an extent as have the markets 
for Burmese exports. Again, however, it is difficult to attribute 
these changes to government policy. Both seem to have been related to 
changes of rice production technologies and the international rice
market.
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Thus, the stated aims of government seem to have been fulfilled 
to a degree. Both production and exports have been diversified. The 
links between this and specific government policies are, however, more 
difficult to establish.
Final!./, the difficulties with data should again be stressed. 
These data are not particularly reliable and some problems with 
consistency were encountered. The conclusions of the study should be 
interpreted in this light. Burma clearly needs more and better data 
for efficient planning, particularly on the profitability in real 
terms to farmers of various crop mixes and technology choices.
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APPENDIX A
Adjustment to rice estimates to take into account production in areas 
unrecorded prior to 1961-62
In the 1950s an official estimate was given of the country’s 
total paddy production in 1936-37 to 1940-41 which took production in 
unrecorded districts into account. This estimates production at 
7,545,000 tons (Economic Survey of Burma, various issues).Recorded 
output in this period was 7,053,000 tons in Burma Proper and 92,000 in
other areas of Divisional Burma, so that production in the frontier
states must have been estimated at 400,000 tons. If it is assumed
that yields per hectare were the same in unrecorded districts in the
frontier states as in recorded districts , the total would compare
with the latest rice production estimates as follows.
Paddy crop Output Area Yield
('000 tons) (’000 ha) (Kg/ha)
1936/7-1940/1
Burma Proper 7053 4953 1424
Recorded in ’States’ 92 64 1422
Not recorded in ’States' 400 282 1422
7545 5299 1424
1975/6-1979/80
Union 9778 5177 1889
Change +• 29.6 - 2.3 +• 32.7
Sources: Calculated from Economic Survey of Burma, Agricultural
Yearbook, various issues.
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APPENDIX B *
Rice Area (a) and Yields by Divisions and Frontier States
1950-1 1961-2 1968-9 1975-6 change
to to to to 1961 -62 to
1960-1 1967-8 1974-5 1979-80 1979-80
AREA, »000 ha %
Lower Burma 3189 3669 3663 3674 5 0.1
Upper Burma 772 79H 939 1017 223 23.1
States 64(b) 482 465 486 4 0.8
Total 4025(b) 4945 5067 5177 232 4.7
OUTPUT '000 mt 
Lower Burma 5037 6052 6232 7303 1251 20.7
Upper Burma 832 939 1269 1746 757 76.5
States 96(b) 594 632 729 135 22.7
Total 5965(b) 7635 8133 9778 2143 28.1
YIELD kg/ha 
Lower Burma 1579 1650 1701 1988 338 20.5
Upper Burma 1078 1246 1351 1717 471 37.8
States 1500(b) 1232 1359 1500 268 21.8
Total 1482(b) 1544 1605 1889 345 22.3
BURMA PROPER AVERAGE
AREA ’000 ha 
Lower Burma 3189 3669 3663 3674 485 15.2
Upper Burma 772 794 939 1017 245 31.7
Total 3961 4463 4602 4691 +730 + 18.4
OUTPUT ’000 mt 
Lower Burma 5037 6052 6232 7303 +2266 +45.0
Upper Burma 832 989 1269 1746 914 109.9
Total 5869 7041 7501 9049 3180 54.2
YIELD kg/ha 
Lower Burma 1579 1650 1701 1988
COo•=r+ 25.8
Upper Burma 1078 1246 1351 1717 639 59.3
Total 1482 1578 1630 1929 430 29.0
* Regional definitions and sources, as Appendix C1-C3.
(a) Gross sown area.
(b) Incomplete coverage.
Sources: Calculated from Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
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APPENDIX C(1)
"Lower Burma"(a) Rice Area, Output, Yield, Irrigation,
and Fertiliser Use
Season Rice Production Yield Irrigated Fertilizer
sown area (*000 m.t.) (Kg/ha) area for rice (m.t.)
('’000ha) (’000 ha)
1950-51 2901 4457 1536
1951-52 3015 4750 1576
1952-53 3140 5015 1597 57.11
1953-54 3267 4816 1474 59.54
1954-55 3221 4980 1546 33.21
1955-56 3217 4825 1500 31.19
1956-57 3179 5158 1623 29.16
1957-58 3158 4480 1419 29.57
1958-59 3304 5723 1732 32.40
1959-60 3285 5552 1690 31.19
1960-61 3390 5655 1668 33.62
1961-62 3414 5507 1613 39.69
1962-63 3601 6091 1692 45.36
1963-64 3787 6256 1652 63.59
1964-65 3786 6678 1764 59.13
1965-66 3766 6492 1724 53.46 163
1966-67 3691 5062 1371 53.62 637
1967-68 3636 6278 1727 53.26 3958
1968-69 3906 5999 1536 63.34 11323
1969-70 3621 6196 1711 62.53 13215
1970-71 3617 6275 1735 62.49 11709
1971-72 3564 6348 1781 62.41 21022
1972-73 3638 5962 1639 65.25 34746
1973-74 3611 6387 1769 78.98 42258
1974-75 3681 6458 1754 109.36 46059
1975-76 3656 6824 1867 101.26 46392
1976-77 3666 7109 1939 n.a. n.a.
1977-78 3664 7150 1951 n.a. n.a.
1978-79 3673 7800 2124 n.a. n.a.
1979—80(p) 3713 7632 2056 n.a. n.a.
a "Lower Burma"= Divisions of Irrawaddy, Pegu, Rangoon,
and Tenasserim,and states of Arakan, Mon, and Kawthoolay
n.a. Not available.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook and Agricultural Statistics,
various issues.
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APPENDIX C(2)
"Upper Burma"(a), Rice Area, Output, Yield, Irrigation and 
Fertiliser Use
Season Rice
sown area 
( ’OOOha)
Production 
(f000 m.t.)
Yield
(Kg/ha)
Irrigated 
area for rice 
(’000 ha)
Fertilizer 
(m.t.)
1950-51 757 869 1148
1951-52 765 742 970
1952-53 828 929 1122 458
1953-54 780 778 997 451
1954-55 698 578 828 425
1955-56 769 783 1018 452
1956-57 833 1001 1202 475
1957-58 766 724 945 448
1958-59 717 740 1032 416
1959-60 839 1178 1404 466
1960-61 737 829 1125 428
1961-62 744 927 1246 422
1962-63 784 1014 1293 440
1963-64 767 956 1246 439
1964-65 846 1224 1447 459
1965-66 770 951 1235 410 27
1966-67 813 969 1192 422 170
1967-68 835 879 1053 454 1313
1968-69 914 1373 1502 483 3766
1969-70 877 1209 1379 459 4392
1970-71 903 1261 1397 465 3892
1971-72 921 1199 1302 478 6937
1972-73 919 792 862 456 6882
1973-74 1013 1567 1547 531 13950
1974-75 1026 1482 1444 548 15310
1975-76 1044 1625 1557 533 23970
1976-77 938 1532 1633 n.a. n.a.
1977-78 993 1609 1620 n.a. n.a.
1978-79 1079 1947 1804 n.a. n.a.
197 9 —80(p) 1032 2019 1956 n.a. n.a.
a "Upper Burma"= Divisions of Sagaing, Mandalay, and Magwe. 
n.a. Not available
Sources, as Appendix C(1)
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APPENDIX C(3)
"Frontier States"(a), Rice Area, Output, Yield, Irrigation 
and Fertiliser Use
Season Rice
sown area 
(’OOOha)
Production 
(’000 m.t.
Yields 
)(Kg/ha)
Irrigated 
area for rice 
(’000 ha)
Fertilizer 
(m.t.)
1950-51 48.60 61 1255
1951-52 50.63 72 1422
1952-53 51.03 68 1333 3.65
1953-54 56.70 68 1199 3.65
1954-55 58.32 76 1303 3.65
1955-56 67.23 85 1264 3.65
1956-57 67.64 116 1715 3.65
1957-58 67.64 104 1538 3.65
1958-59 69.26 116 1675 5.67
1959-60 78.57 134 1706 7.70
1960-61 92.75 154 1660 3.10
1961-62 525.29* 483 920 10.53
1962-63 440.64 696 1580 14.18
1963-64 498.56 568 1139 159.57
1964-65 472.64 583 1234 164.43
1965-66 481.14 613 1274 169.70 13
1966-67 489.65 605 1236 187.11 70
1967-68 467.38 612 1309 182.25 411
1968-69 473.85 640 1351 194.00 1173
1969-70 460.90 635 1378 194.81 1345
1970-71 459.27 626 1363 208.58 1192
1971-72 456.84 630 1379 212.22 2138
1972-73 461.70 604 1308 210.20 2930
1973-74 469.00 645 1375 215.46 4693
1974-75 473.45 641 1354 215.05 4685
1975-76 478.72 676 1412 219.51 3920
1976-77 477.90 678 1419
1977-78 481.95 702 1457
1978-79 495.72 780 1574
1979—80(p) 495.72 809 1632
a "Frontier States"= Chin, Kachin, Kayah and Shan. 
Sources, as Appendix C(1).
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APPENDIX D
Sown Area by Crops in Different Regions 
( ’ 000 hectares)
Crops 1963-64 !
1
1
1969-70to
1971-72
annual average
! 1976-77 to
! 1978-79
! annual average
L.B. U.B. F.S ! L.B. U.B. F.S ! L.B. U.B. F.S
! !
Paddy 3787 7 6 7 . 0 498.6J3601 900.3 459 !
f
3668 1003 485.2
Wheat * 75.9 12.6! * 60.5 12.8! 0.1 80.1 139.0
Maize 11 77.6 55.6! 13.4 98.3 50.5! 14.5 142.9 59.4
Groundnut 130 428.9 44.6! 160.5 484.3 28.2! 158.2 446.4 37.8
Sesamum 9 635.0 8.2! 16.3 895.4 9.7! 27.6 1004.6 11.8
Cotton 1.4 270.7 1.0! 2.6 182.4 1.3! 3.6 177.5 1.8
Jute 20.5 1.5 * ! 53.8 2.3 * ! 76.7 0.5 -
Kenaf 1.1 7.9 0.8! * 1.1 0.4! * 0.1 «
Rubber 8 3 . 6 - _  1 88.3 - _ » 8 2 . 6 - -
Pulses 136 .6 578.5 20.4! 107.9 529.6 17.7! 118.9 524.4 2 3 . 2
Chillies 11.2 39.9 3.2! 1 6 . 2 47.3 2.5! 23.3 47.7 4.4
Onions 0.7 14.6 0.5! 1.3 1 8 .0 1.1 ! 1.3 20.4 1 . 0
Garlic * 2 . 8 5.4! # 2.3 5.1! * 1.7 6 . 0
Potatoe 0.4 1 .2 14.9! 0.5 1 . 6 7 .8 ! 0.5 1 .6 10.1
TobaccoCVir)* 3.0 0.4! - 4.7 0.7! - 6.5 0.9
Tobacco(Bu)20.1 3 0 . 2 3 .6 ! 1 6 . 0 29.3 3.6 ! 18.4 37.1 2.9
Sugarcane 17.4 14.1 7.9! 55.0 24.9 15.2! 40.2 3 8 . 2 29.1
Fruit 167.0 6.4 9 .6 ! 127.3 9.9 11.2 ! 1 3 3 .8 1 0 .0 13.1
Residual 138 .0 494.0 43.0!
1
170.0 6 1 9 . 0 43.0!
1
2 0 0 . 0 722.0 6 0 . 0
Total non- 749 2682 2 3 1.0 ! 829.0 3 0 1 1 . 0 2 1 1.0 ! 900 3262.0 275.0
rice 1 1
Totalsown 4536 3449 730 .'4430.0 3 9 1 1 . 0 6 7 0.0 ! 4568 4265 760
area j »
% paddy 1 1
of adjusted 8 3 . 5 2 2 . 2 68.3! 81.3 2 3 . 0 68.5! 80.3 23.5 6 3 . 8
total 1 1
L.B.= Lower Burma; U.B.= Upper Burma; F.S.= Frontier States, 
definition of these regions given in Appendices C(1)-C(3).
* Less than 500 hectares.
Sources: Calculated from Agricultural Statistics, Statistical
Yearbook, various issues.
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APPENDIX E
Changes in the State Capital Expenditure (a) 
(in million kyats) (b)
Sector 1952-53to 1956-57to 1961-62to 1970-71 to 1975-76to
1955-56 1961-62 1967-68 1974-75 1979-80
average average average average average
Agriculture 33.7 21.45 75.30 71.50 235.25
(7.7) (6.1) (12.6) (7.8) (9.2)
Livestock and - 0.38 4.70 8.00 157.75
Fishery (0.1) (0.8) (0.9) (6.1)
Forestry 7.7 2.93 13.78 26.25 90.50
(1.5) (0.9) (2.3) (2.9) (3.5)
Mining 3.9 2.78 26.64 86.50 283.00
(0.8) (0.8) (4.4) (9.4) (11.0)
Processing and 46.6 17.49 120.15 331.50 825.25
Manufacturing (9.3) (5.0) (20.0) (36.0) (32.1)
Others 406.4 305.54 359.13 396.75 979.25
(80.7) (87.1) (59.9) (43.0) (38.1)
Total 503.3 350.57 599.70 920.50 2571 .0
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Investment 100 70 119 183 511
Index (b)
(a) Figures in brackets are percentages.
(b) In current prices.
Sources: Calculated from Second Four Year Plan ,Ministry
of National Planning., Si-pwa-ye Sa-sin 
No :6,1961., Report to the People 1970-71,1971-72., 
Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw 1975-76,1977-78 and 
1979-80, chapter 6.
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APPENDIX F
General Trade Exports(f.o.b) and Imports(c.i.f.) 
(in million Kyats)
Year Exports Imports Trade Balance Terms of Trade
1937 518.2 244.2 274.0
1950 660.8 432.3 228.5 124.9
1951 980.8 681.2 299.6 164.3
1952 1097.3 817.8 279.5 201.7
1953 1132.7 846.0 286.7 170.0
1954 1195.7 972.8 222.9 132.5
1955 1081.4 860.2 221.2 111.1
1956 1191.3 942.7 248.6 116.0
1957 1088.7 1412.1 - 323.4 109.5
1958 926.5 973.6 - 47.1 112.9
1959 1068.5 1065.9 2.6 111.9
1960 1075.1 1239.0 - 163.9 110.1
1961 1056.7 1027.5 29.2 124.2
1962 1261.1 1042.0 219.1 113.1
1963 1287.6 1115.3 172.3 116.61964 1125.5 1292.7 - 167.2 109.2
1965 1076.0 1178.0 - 102.0 118.3
1966 934.0 751.9 182.1 116.9
1967 590.3 741.2 - 150.9 121.8
1968 529.4 858.7 - 329.3 133.7
1969 629.1 784.8 - 155.7 100.0
1970 515.8 807.0 - 291.2 85.7
1971 609.6 933.3 - 323.7 71.5
1972 654.7 866.6 - 211.9 83.8
1973 698.6 702.7 - 4.1 150.4
1974 958.4 1047.2 - 88.8 113.7
1975 1104.6 1612.6 - 508.0 93.4
1976 1304.4 1311.1 - 6.7 83.6
1977 1610.4 2200.3 - 589.9 88.0
1978 1665.9 2114.0 - 448.1 87.0
1979 2412.3 2116.1 296.2 92.5
1980 3122.6 2337.3 785.3 104.2
Source: UN Year Book of International Trade Statistics, 
1966 and 1980.
Internal Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics 1981.
Page 99
APPENDIX G
Burma and World Rice Export 
(’000 mt milled rice)
Year Burma World Total Burma/World
(f)
Burma Rice Price (a) 
Kyats/t US$/ton
1950 1184 4136
1951 1268 5029
1952 1260 5166 705.19 148
1953 973 4465 826.00 173
1954 1460 4635 622.29 131
1955 1638 5529 489.10 103
1956 1864 6565 453.19 95
1957 1753 6230 439.86 92
1958 1410 6610 465.48 98
1959 1692 6980 424.52 89
1960 1749 7136 395.00 83
1961 1591 6626 432.76 91
1962 1715 6408 460.52 97
1963 1686 7392 476.48 100
1964 1456 7920 490.00 103
1965 1342 8119 487.90 102
1966 1110 7821 507.10 106
1967 537 7454 7.2 579.62 122
1968 346 7936 4.4 687.14 144
1969 553 8459 6.5 571.19 120
1970 667 8847 7.5 386.14 81
1971 831 9332 8.9 349.52 73
1972 561 9429 5.9 402.89 85
1973 150 9228 1.6 597.20 123
1974 211 8308 2.5 1803.76 375
1975 286 7160 4.0 1602.81 240
1976 658 8696 7.6 1095.60 163
1977 671 10595 6.3 1245.93 176
1978 351 9431 3.7 1344.93 204
1979 591 12123 4.9 1496.53 230
1980 663 12461 5.3 1830.27 271
a : Conversion to US$, par value, IMF line ae.
Sources: Calculated from
Palacpac;1976,pp42-3.
Palacpac;1982,pp42-3.
I.M.F., International Financial Statistics 1982.
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APPENDIX (H)
Value of Exported Commodities 
(in million kyats (a) and per cent)
Commodity 1937—4 0 1950-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80
average average average average average average average
Rice 232.22 784.57 754.69 740.15 282.62 287.29 860.62
(44.8) (76.9) (70.5) (63.7) (44.2) (32.6) (45.6)
Maize - 5.24 4.99 4.59 2.55 3.36 1
( 0.5) ( 0.5) ( 0.4) ( 0.4) ( 0.4) 1
Fruit and 9.21 36.40 44.21 56.37 38.98 56.92 ;
vegetable ( 1.8) ( 3.6) ( 4.1) ( 4.9) ( 6.1) ( 6.5) 1
Tobacco 0.44 0.18 0.17 0.11 - - 1
( 0.1) ( 0.01) ( 0.02) (0.01) !110.06
Rubber 5.98 24.47 37.21 23.67 14.88 17.68 !( 5.8)
( 1.2) ( 2.4) ( 3.5) ( 2.0) ( 2.3) ( 2.0) 1
Cotton 8.87 43.32 30.30 32.98 3.91 - 1
( 1.7) ( 4.2) ( 2.8) ( 2.9) ( 0.6) »
Jute - - - 1.38 2.30 32.42 1
( 0.1) ( 0.4) ( 3.7) 1
AnimalFeed- 4.20 25.92 51.57 74.42 33.27 54.50 40.30
ing Stuff ( 0.8) ( 2.52) ( 4.8) ( 6.4) ( 5.2) ( 6.2) ( 2.1)
Timber 36.52 34.26 67.17 140.28 138.65 209.14 514.08
( 7.1) ( 3.36) ( 6.3) (12.1) (21.7) (23.8) (27.3)
Others 220.62 65.47 77.71 87.43 122.56 221.36 362.10
(44.4) ( 6.51) ( 7.4) (7.62) (19.25) (24.9) (19.2)
Total 518.08 1019.83 1070.02 1161.38 639.72 880.67 1887.16
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Index (b) ( 50.8) (100.0) (105) (114) ( 63) ( 86) (185)
Concentra- 54.1 77.4 71.3 65.6 51.7 44.1 55.4
tion Index
(a) At current prices.
(b) 1950-55 = 100
Sources: Calculated from The Economic Development of
Burma, Economics Dept.; University of 
Rangoon.,1959. Year Book of International Trade 
Statistics, various issues., Report to the Pyithu 
Hluttaw, 1979-80 and 1982-83.
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